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Abstract
We extend description logics (DLs) with non-monotonic reasoning features. We
start by investigating a notion of defeasible subsumption in the spirit of defeasible con-
ditionals as studied by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor in the propositional case. In
particular, we consider a natural and intuitive semantics for defeasible subsumption,
and investigate KLM-style syntactic properties for both preferential and rational sub-
sumption. Our contribution includes two representation results linking our semantic
constructions to the set of preferential and rational properties considered. Besides
showing that our semantics is appropriate, these results pave the way for more effec-
tive decision procedures for defeasible reasoning in DLs. Indeed, we also analyse the
problem of non-monotonic reasoning in DLs at the level of entailment and present
an algorithm for the computation of rational closure of a defeasible ontology. Im-
portantly, our algorithm relies completely on classical entailment and shows that the
computational complexity of reasoning over defeasible ontologies is no worse than
that of reasoning in the underlying classical DL ALC.
Keywords: Description logics, non-monotonic reasoning, defeasible subsumption,
preferential semantics, rational closure.
1 Introduction
Description logics (DLs) [1] are central to many modern AI and database applications since
they provide the logical foundation of formal ontologies. Yet, as classical formalisms, DLs
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do not allow for the proper representation of and reasoning with defeasible information,
as shown up in the following example, adapted from Giordano et al.’s [46]: Students do
not get tax invoices; employed students do; employed students who are also parents do
not. From a naïve (classical) formalisation of this scenario, one concludes that the notion
of employed student is an oxymoron, and, consequently, the concept of employed student
is unsatisfiable. But while concept unsatisfiability has been investigated extensively in
ontology debugging and repair [61, 71], our research problem here goes beyond that, as
will become clear in the upcoming sections.
Endowing DLs with defeasible reasoning features is therefore a promising endeavour
from the point of view of applications of knowledge representation and reasoning. In-
deed, the past 25 years have witnessed many attempts to introduce defeasible-reasoning
capabilities in a DL setting, usually drawing on a well-established body of research on non-
monotonic reasoning (NMR). These comprise the so-called preferential approaches [21, 22,
24, 37, 40, 46, 47, 51, 52, 66, 67], circumscription-based ones [9, 10, 72], amongst oth-
ers [2, 3, 8, 43, 53, 54, 55, 62, 65, 74].
Preferential extensions of DLs turn out to be particularly promising, mainly because
they are based on an elegant, comprehensive and well-studied framework for non-monotonic
reasoning in the propositional case proposed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [56, 59] and
often referred to as the KLM approach. Such a framework is valuable for a number of
reasons. First, it provides for a thorough analysis of some formal properties that any con-
sequence relation deemed as appropriate in a non-monotonic setting ought to satisfy. Such
formal properties, which resemble those of a Gentzen-style proof system (see Section 3.1),
play a central role in assessing how intuitive the obtained results are and enable a more
comprehensive characterisation of the introduced non-monotonic conditional from a log-
ical point of view. Second, the KLM approach allows for many decision problems to be
reduced to classical entailment checking, sometimes without blowing up the computational
complexity compared to the underlying classical case. Finally, it has a well-known connec-
tion with the AGM-approach to belief revision [45, 69] and with frameworks for reasoning
under uncertainty [7, 44]. It is therefore reasonable to expect that most, if not all, of the
aforementioned features of the KLM approach should transfer to KLM-based extensions
of DLs, too.
Following the motivation laid out above, several extensions to the KLM approach to
description logics have been proposed recently [21, 24, 27, 29, 32, 33, 37, 40, 46, 47, 51,
52, 63, 75], each of them investigating particular constructions and variants of the prefer-
ential approach. However, here our aim is to provide a comprehensive study of the formal
foundations of preferential defeasible reasoning in DLs. By that we mean (i) defining a
general and intuitive semantics; (ii) showing that the corresponding representation results
(in the KLM sense of the term) hold, linking our semantic constructions with the KLM-
style set of properties, and (iii) presenting an appropriate analysis of entailment in the
context of ontologies with defeasible information with an associated decision procedure
that is implementable.
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In the remainder of the paper, we shall take the following route: After providing the
required background on the DL we consider in this work as well as fixing the notation (Sec-
tion 2), we introduce the notion of defeasible subsumption along with a set of KLM-inspired
properties it ought to satisfy (Section 3). In particular, using an intuitive semantics for
the idea that “usually, an element of the class C is also an element of the class D”, we
provide a characterisation (via representation results) of two important classes of defeasi-
ble statements, namely preferential and rational subsumption. In Section 4, we start by
investigating two obvious candidates for the notion of entailment in the context of defea-
sible DLs, namely preferential and modular entailment. These turn out not to have all
properties seen as important in a non-monotonic DL setting, mimicking a similar result
in the propositional case [59]. Therefore, we propose a notion of rational entailment and
show that it is the definition of consequence we are looking for. We take this definition
further by exploring the relationship that rational entailment has with both Lehmann and
Magidor’s [59] definition of rational closure and the more recent algorithm by Casini and
Straccia [37] for its computation (Section 5). After a discussion of, and comparison with,
related work (Section 6), we conclude with a summary of our contributions and some
directions for further exploration. Proofs of our results can be found in the appendix.
2 Logical preliminaries
Description Logics (DLs) [1] are decidable fragments of first-order logic with interesting
properties and a variety of applications. There is a whole family of description logics, an
example of which is ALC and on which we shall focus in the present paper.1
The (concept) language of ALC is built upon a finite set of atomic concept names C, a
finite set of role names R (a.k.a. attributes) and a finite set of individual names I such that
C, R and I are pairwise disjoint. In our scenario example, we can have for instance C =
{Employee,Company, Student,EmpStud,Parent,Tax}, R = {pays, empBy,worksFor}, and I =
{john, ibm,mary}, with the respective obvious intuitions. With A,B, . . . we denote atomic
concepts, with r, s, . . . role names, and with a, b, . . . individual names. Complex concepts
are denoted with C,D, . . . and are built using the constructors ¬ (complement), ⊓ (concept
conjunction), ⊔ (concept disjunction), ∀ (value restriction) and ∃ (existential restriction)
according to the following grammar rules:
C ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | C | (¬C) | (C ⊓ C) | (C ⊔ C) | (∃r.C) | (∀r.C)
With L we denote the language of all ALC concepts, which is understood as the smallest
set of symbol sequences generated according to the rules above. When writing down
1For the reader not conversant with Description Logics but familiar with modal logics, there are results
in the literature relating some families of description logics to systems of modal logic. For example, a
well-known result is the one linking the DL ALC with the normal modal logic K [70].
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concepts of L, we follow the usual convention and omit parentheses whenever they are
not essential for disambiguation. Examples of ALC concepts in our scenario are Student⊓
Employee and ¬∃pays.Tax.
The semantics of ALC is the standard set-theoretic Tarskian semantics. An interpreta-
tion is a structure I =def 〈∆I , ·I〉, where ∆I is a non-empty set called the domain, and ·I
is an interpretation function mapping concept names A to subsets AI of ∆I , role names r
to binary relations rI over ∆I , and individual names a to elements of the domain ∆I , i.e.,
AI ⊆ ∆I , rI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I , and aI ∈ ∆I .
Figure 1 depicts an interpretation for our scenario example with domain ∆I = {xi |
0 ≤ i ≤ 10}, and interpreting the elements of the vocabulary as follows: EmployeeI =
{x1, x2, x5, x9}, Company
I = {x6, x10}, Student
I = {x1, x5, x7, x8}, EmpStud
I = {x1, x5},
ParentI = {x1, x2, x3}, Tax
I = {x4}, pays
I = {(x1, x0), (x5, x4)}, empBy
I = {(x9, x10)},
worksForI = {(x5, x6), (x9, x10)}, john
I = x5, ibm
I = x6, mary
I = x2.
I : ∆
I
TaxI
ParentI
StudentI Employee
I
CompanyI
E
m
p
S
tu
d
I
x0 x1 x2(mary) x3
x4 x5(john) x6(ibm)
x7 x8 x9 x10
pays
pays worksFor
worksFor
empBy
Figure 1: A DL interpretation.
Let I = 〈∆I , ·I〉 be an interpretation and define rI(x) =def {y ∈ ∆I | (x, y) ∈ rI},
for r ∈ R. We extend the interpretation function ·I to interpret complex concepts of L as
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follows:
⊤I =def ∆I ;
⊥I =def ∅;
(¬C)I =def ∆I \ CI ;
(C ⊓D)I =def CI ∩DI ;
(C ⊔D)I =def CI ∪DI ;
(∃r.C)I =def {x ∈ ∆I | rI(x) ∩ CI 6= ∅};
(∀r.C)I =def {x ∈ ∆I | rI(x) ⊆ CI}.
For the interpretation I in Figure 1, we have (Parent ⊓ Employee)I = {x1, x2} and
(∃pays.Tax)I = {x5}.
Given C,D ∈ L, a statement of the form C ⊑ D is called a subsumption statement, or
general concept inclusion (GCI), read “C is subsumed by D”. A concrete example of GCI
is EmpStud ⊑ Student ⊓ Employee. C ≡ D is an abbreviation for both C ⊑ D and D ⊑ C.
An ALC TBox T is a finite set of GCIs. Given C ∈ L, r ∈ R and a, b ∈ I, an assertional
statement (assertion, for short) is an expression of the form a : C or (a, b) : r, read,
respectively, “a is an instance of C” and “a is related to b via r”. Examples of assertions
are john : EmpStud and (john, ibm) : worksFor. An ALC ABox A is a finite set of assertional
statements. We denote statements with α, β, . . .. Given T and A, with KB =def T ∪A we
denote an ALC knowledge base, a.k.a. an ontology, an example of which is given below:
T =


EmpStud ⊑ Student ⊓ Employee,
Student ⊑ ¬∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud ⊑ ∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud ⊓ Parent ⊑ ¬∃pays.Tax,
Employee ⊑ ∃worksFor.Company


A = {john : EmpStud, john : Parent, (john, ibm) : worksFor}
An interpretation I satisfies a GCI C ⊑ D (denoted I  C ⊑ D) if CI ⊆ DI . (And
then I  C ≡ D if CI = DI .) I satisfies an assertion a : C (respectively, (a, b) : r),
denoted I  a : C (respectively, I  (a, b) : r), if aI ∈ CI (respectively, (aI , bI) ∈ rI).
In the interpretation I in Figure 1, we have I  EmpStud ⊑ Student ⊓ Employee,
I  john : ∃pays.Tax and I 6 (john, ibm) : empBy.
We say that an interpretation I is a model of a TBox T (respectively, of an ABox A),
denoted I  T (respectively, I  A) if I  α for every α in T (respectively, in A). We
say that I is a model of a knowledge base KB = T ∪ A if I  T and I  A. It can be
verified that the interpretation in Figure 1 is not a model of the example knowledge base
above. (Actually, it is not hard to see that the knowledge base above admits no model.)
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A statement α is (classically) entailed by a knowledge base KB, denoted KB |= α, if
every model of KB satisfies α. If I  α for all interpretations I, we say α is a validity and
denote this fact with |= α.
The focus of the present paper being on defeasibility for description logic TBoxes only,
we henceforth assume the ABox is empty. (We are currently in the process of extending
our approach to description logic knowledge bases, with ABoxes included into the mix.) It
is easy to see that, for T as above, we have T |= EmpStud ⊑ ⊥.
For more details on Description Logics in general and on ALC in particular, the reader
is invited to consult the Description Logic Handbook [1] and the introductory textbook on
Description Logic [4].
3 Foundations for defeasibility in DLs
In this section, we lay the formal foundations of our approach to defeasible reasoning
in DL ontologies. For the most part, we build on the so-called preferential approach to
non-monotonic reasoning [56, 59, 73].
3.1 Defeasible subsumption relations and their KLM-style prop-
erties
In a sense, class subsumption (alias concept inclusion) of the form C ⊑ D is the main notion
in DL ontologies. Given its implication-like intuition, subsumption lends itself naturally
to defeasibility: “provisionally, if an object falls under C, then it also falls under D”, as
in “usually, students are tax exempted”. In that respect, a defeasible version of concept
inclusion is the starting point for an investigation of defeasible reasoning in DL ontologies.
(We shall also address defeasibility of the entailment relation in later sections.)
Definition 1 (Defeasible Concept Inclusion) Let C,D ∈ L. A defeasible concept
inclusion axiom (DCI, for short) is a statement of the form C ⊏∼D.
A defeasible concept inclusion of the form C⊏∼D is to be read as “usually, an instance of
the class C is also an instance of the class D”. For instance, the DCI Student⊏∼¬∃pays.Tax
formalises the example above. Paraphrasing Lehmann [57], the intuition of C ⊏∼D is that
“if [the fact it belongs to] C were all the information about an object available to an agent,
then [that it also belongs to] D would be a sensible conclusion to draw about such an
object”. It is worth noting that ⊏∼ , just as ⊑, is a ‘connective’ sitting between the concept
language (object level) and the meta-language (that of entailment) and it is meant to be
the defeasible counterpart of the classical subsumption ⊑.
Being (defeasible) statements, DCIs will also be denoted by α, β, . . . Whenever a dis-
tinction between GCIs and DCIs is in order, we shall make it explicitly.
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Definition 2 (Defeasible TBox) A defeasible TBox (DTBox, for short) is a finite
set of DCIs.
Given a TBox T and a DTBox D, we let KB =def T ∪ D and refer to it as a defeasible
knowledge base (alias defeasible ontology).
Example 1 The following defeasible knowledge base gives a formal specification for our
student scenario:
T = {EmpStud ⊑ Student}
D =


Student⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud⊏∼ ∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud ⊓ Parent⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax


In our semantic construction later on, it will also be useful to be able to refer to infinite
sets of concept inclusions. Let KBinf therefore denote a defeasible theory, defined as a
defeasible knowledge base but without the restriction on T and D to finite sets.
In order to assess the behaviour of the new connective and check it against both the
intuition and the set of properties usually considered in a non-monotonic setting, it is con-
venient to look at a set of ⊏∼ -statements as a binary relation of the ‘antecedent-consequent’
kind.
Definition 3 (Defeasible Subsumption Relation) A defeasible subsumption re-
lation is a binary relation ⊏∼ ⊆ L× L.
The idea is to mimic the analysis of defeasible entailment relations carried out by
Kraus et al. [56] in the propositional case, where entailment is seen as a binary relation
on the set of propositional sentences. Here we shall adopt the view of subsumption as a
binary relation on concepts of our description language.
Sometimes (e.g. in the structural properties below) we shall write (C,D) ∈ ⊏∼ in the
infix notation, i.e., as C ⊏∼D. The context will make clear when we will be talking about
elements of a relation or statements (DCIs) in a defeasible knowledge base. Whenever
disambiguation is in order, we shall flag it to the reader.
Definition 4 (Preferential Subsumption Relation) A defeasible subsumption relation ⊏∼
is a preferential subsumption relation if it satisfies the following set of properties,
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which we refer to as the (DL versions of the) preferential KLM properties:
(Cons) ⊤ 6⊏∼⊥ (Ref) C ⊏∼ C (LLE)
C ≡ D, C ⊏∼ E
D ⊏∼E
(And)
C ⊏∼D, C ⊏∼E
C ⊏∼D ⊓ E
(Or)
C ⊏∼ E, D ⊏∼E
C ⊔D ⊏∼ E
(RW)
C ⊏∼D, D ⊑ E
C ⊏∼ E
(CM)
C ⊏∼D, C ⊏∼ E
C ⊓D ⊏∼ E
The (Cons) property is a consequence of the adoption of a DL-based semantics, which
enforces the non-emptiness of the domain, as will become clear in the next section. The rest
of the properties in Definition 4 result from a translation of the properties for preferential
consequence relations proposed by Kraus et al. [56] in the propositional setting. They
have been discussed at length in the literature for both the propositional and the DL
cases [21, 24, 48, 49, 56, 59] and we shall not repeat so here.
If, in addition to the preferential properties above, the relation ⊏∼ also satisfies rational
monotonicity (RM) below, then it is said to be a rational subsumption relation:
(RM)
C ⊏∼D, C 6⊏∼ ¬E
C ⊓ E ⊏∼D
Rational monotonicity is often considered a desirable property to have, one of the rea-
sons stemming from the fact it is a necessary condition for the satisfaction of the principle
of presumption of typicality [58, Section 3.1]. Such a principle is a simple yet intuitive
formalisation of a form of reasoning we carry out when facing lack of information: we
reason assuming that we are in the most typical possible situation, compatible with the
information at our disposal. (More details will be provided in Section 4).
3.2 Preferential semantics and representation results
In this section, we present our semantics for preferential and rational subsumption by en-
riching standard DL interpretations I with an ordering on the elements of the domain ∆I .
The intuition underlying this is simple and natural, and extends similar work done for
the propositional case by Shoham [73], Kraus et al. [56], Lehmann and Magidor [59] and
Booth et al. [12, 13, 14] to the case for description logics. This is not the first exten-
sion of this kind, as evidenced by the work of Boutilier [16], Baltag and Smets [5, 6],
Giordano et al. [46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52], Britz et al. [19, 20, 21, 22, 24] and Britz and Varz-
inczak [26, 27, 30, 29, 31, 32]. However, this is the first comprehensive semantic account
of both preferential and rational subsumption relations, with accompanying representation
results, based on the standard semantics for description logics.
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Informally, our semantic constructions are based on the idea that objects of the domain
can be ordered according to their degree of normality [16] or typicality [13, 14, 22, 46].
Paraphrasing Boutilier [16, pp. 110–116],
Surely there is no inherent property of objects that allows them to be judged
to be more or less normal in absolute terms. These orderings are purely ‘sub-
jective’ (in the sense that they can be thought of as part of an agent’s belief
state) and the space of orderings deemed plausible by the agent may (among
other things) be determined by e.g. empirical data. By using orderings in this
way, we encode our (or the agent’s) expectations about the objects correspond-
ing to their perceived regularity or typicality. Those objects not violating our
expectations are considered to be more normal than the objects that violate
some.
Hence we do not require that there exists something intrinsic about objects that makes
one object more normal than another. Rather, the intention is to provide a framework
in which to express all conceivable ways in which objects, with their associated properties
and relationships with other objects, can be ordered in terms of typicality, in the same
way that the class of all standard DL interpretations constitute a framework representing
all conceivable ways of representing the properties of objects and their relationships with
other objects. Just as the latter are constrained by stating subsumption statements in a
knowledge base, the possible orderings that are considered plausible are encoded by writing
down DCIs.
That said, we are ready for the definition of the first semantic construction the present
work relies on.
Definition 5 (Preferential Interpretation) A preferential interpretation is a tuple
P =def 〈∆P , ·P ,≺P〉, where 〈∆P , ·P〉 is a (standard) DL interpretation (which we denote
by IP and refer to as the classical interpretation associated with P), and ≺P is a strict par-
tial order on ∆P (i.e., ≺P is irreflexive and transitive) satisfying the smoothness condition
(for every C ∈ L, if CP 6= ∅, then min≺P C
P 6= ∅).2
Figure 2 depicts a preferential interpretation in our scenario example where ∆P and ·P
are as in the interpretation I shown in Figure 1, and≺P= {(x7, x5), (x8, x5), (x9, x5), (x5, x1),
(x7, x1), (x8, x1), (x9, x1), (x9, x2), (x10, x6)}, represented by the dashed arrows in the pic-
ture. (For the sake of presentation, in the picture we omit the transitive ≺P -arrows.)
Preferential interpretations provide us with a simple and intuitive way to give a seman-
tics to DCIs.
Definition 6 (Satisfaction) Let P be a preferential interpretation, C,D ∈ L, r ∈ R and
a, b ∈ I. The satisfaction relation  is defined as follows:
2Given X ⊆ ∆P , with min≺P X we denote the set {x ∈ X | for every y ∈ X, y 6≺
P x}.
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P : ∆
P
TaxP
ParentP
StudentP Employee
P
CompanyP
E
m
p
S
tu
d
P
x0 x1 x2(mary) x3
x4 x5(john) x6(ibm)
x7 x8 x9 x10
pays
pays worksFor
worksFor
empBy
Figure 2: A preferential interpretation.
• P  C ⊑ D if CP ⊆ DP ;
• P  C ⊏∼D if min≺P C
P ⊆ DP .
If P  α, then we say P satisfies α. P satisfies a defeasible knowledge base KB, written
P  KB, if P  α for every α ∈ KB, in which case we say P is a preferential model
of KB. We say C ∈ L is satisfiable w.r.t. KB if there is a model P of KB s.t. CP 6= ∅.
It is easy to see that the addition of the ≺P -component preserves the truth of all
classical subsumption statements holding in the remaining structure:
Lemma 1 Let P be a preferential interpretation. For every C,D ∈ L, P  C ⊑ D if and
only if IP  C ⊑ D.
It is worth noting that, due to smoothness of ≺P , every (classical) subsumption state-
ment is equivalent, with respect to preferential interpretations, to some DCI.
Lemma 2 For every preferential interpretation P, and every C,D ∈ L, P  C ⊑ D if
and only if P  C ⊓ ¬D ⊏∼⊥.
The following result, of which the proof can be found in Appendix A, will come in
handy later on.
Lemma 3 Preferential interpretations are closed under disjoint union.
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An obvious question that can now be raised is: “How do we know our preferential
semantics provides an appropriate meaning to the notion of defeasible concept inclusion?”
The following definition will help us in answering this question:
Definition 7 (P-Induced Defeasible Subsumption) Let P be a preferential interpre-
tation. Then ⊏∼ P =def {(C,D) | P  C ⊏∼ D} is the defeasible subsumption relation
induced by P.
The first important result we present here, which also answers the above raised ques-
tion, shows that there is a full correspondence between the class of preferential subsumption
relations and the class of defeasible subsumption relations induced by preferential inter-
pretations. It is the DL analogue of a representation result proved by Kraus et al. for the
propositional case [56, Theorem 3] and its proof can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 1 [Representation Result for Preferential Subsumption] A defeasible subsump-
tion relation ⊏∼ ⊆ L×L is preferential if and only if there is a preferential interpretation P
such that ⊏∼ P = ⊏∼ .
What is perhaps surprising about this result is that no additional properties based on
the syntactic structure of the underlying DL are necessary to characterise the defeasible
subsumption relations induced by preferential interpretations. We provide below a few
properties involving the use of quantifiers that are satisfied by all preferential subsump-
tion relations. (See Section 5 for more on properties explicitly mentioning DL-specific
constructs.)
The first two are ‘existential’ and ‘universal’ versions of cautious monotonicity (CM):
(CM∃)
∃r.C ⊏∼ E, ∃r.C ⊏∼ ∀r.D
∃r.(C ⊓D)⊏∼ E
(CM∀)
∀r.C ⊏∼ E, ∀r.C ⊏∼ ∀r.D
∀r.(C ⊓D)⊏∼ E
The third one is a rephrasing of the Rule of Necessitation in modal logic [42]. It guar-
antees the absence of so-called spurious objects [25] in the original preferential semantics
for DLs by Britz et al. [23, 24]. That is, if C is unsatisfiable, then so is ∃r.C (cf. Lemma 2).
(Norm)
C ⊏∼⊥
∃r.C ⊏∼⊥
In addition to preferential interpretations, we are also interested in the study of mod-
ular interpretations, which are preferential interpretations in which the ≺-component is a
modular ordering:
Definition 8 (Modular Order) Given a set X, ≺ ⊆ X ×X is modular if it is a strict
partial order, and its associated incomparability relation ∼, defined by x ∼ y if neither
x ≺ y nor y ≺ x, is transitive.
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If ≺ is modular, then ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Definition 9 (Modular Interpretation) A modular interpretation is a preferential
interpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 such that ≺R is modular.
Intuitively, modular interpretations allow us to compare any two objects w.r.t. their
plausibility. Those that are incomparable are viewed as being equally plausible. As such,
modular interpretations are special cases of preferential interpretations, where plausibility
can be represented by any smooth strict partial order.
The main reason to consider modular interpretations is that they provide the semantic
foundation of rational subsumption relations. This is made precise by our second important
result below, which shows that the defeasible subsumption relations induced by modular
interpretations are precisely the rational subsumption relations. Again, this is the DL
analogue of a representation result proved by Lehmann and Magidor for the propositional
case [59, Theorem 5] and its proof can be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 2 [Representation Result for Rational Subsumption] A defeasible subsumption
relation ⊏∼ ⊆ L×L is rational if and only if there is a modular interpretation R such that
⊏∼ R = ⊏∼ .
Analogous to the case for cautious monotonicity above, the following ‘existential’ and
‘universal’ versions of rational monotonicity are satisfied by all rational subsumption rela-
tions:
(RM∃)
∃r.C ⊏∼ E, ∃r.C 6⊏∼ ∀r.¬D
∃r.(C ⊓D)⊏∼ E
(RM∀)
∀r.C ⊏∼ E, ∀r.C 6⊏∼ ∀r.¬D
∀r.(C ⊓D)⊏∼ E
It is worth pausing for a moment to emphasise the significance of these two results
(Theorems 1 and 2). They provide exact semantic characterisations of two important
classes of defeasible subsumption relations, namely preferential and rational subsumption,
in terms of the classes of preferential and modular interpretations, respectively. As we
shall see in Section 4, these results form the core of the investigation into an appropriate
notion of entailment for defeasible DL ontologies.
4 Rationality in entailment
From the standpoint of knowledge representation and reasoning, a pivotal question is
that of deciding which statements are entailed by a knowledge base. We shall devote the
remainder of the paper to this matter, and in this section we lay out the formal foundations
for that.
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4.1 Preferential entailment
In the exploration of a notion of entailment for defeasible ontologies, an obvious starting
point is to consider a Tarskian definition of consequence:
Definition 10 (Preferential Entailment) A statement α is preferentially entailed
by a defeasible knowledge base KB, written KB |=pref α, if every preferential model of KB
satisfies α.
As usual, this form of entailment is accompanied by a corresponding notion of closure.
Definition 11 (Preferential Closure) Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. With
KB∗pref =def {α | KB |=pref α} we denote the preferential closure of KB.
Intuitively, the preferential closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB corresponds to
the ‘core’ set of statements, classical and defeasible, that should hold given those in KB.
Hence, preferential entailment and preferential closure are two sides of the same coin,
mimicking an analogous result for preferential reasoning in the propositional [56] case.
Recall (cf. the discussion following Definition 2) that a defeasible theory KBinf is a
defeasible knowledge base without the restriction to finite sets. When assessing how ap-
propriate a notion of entailment for defeasible ontologies is, the following definitions turn
out to be useful, as will become clear in the sequel:
Definition 12 (KBinf-Induced Defeasible Subsumption) Let KBinf be a defeasible the-
ory. Then (1) DKBinf =def {C ⊏∼ D | C ⊏∼ D ∈ KBinf} ∪ {C ⊓ ¬D ⊏∼ ⊥ | C ⊑ D ∈ KBinf}
is the DTBox induced by KBinf and (2) ⊏∼ KBinf =def {(C,D) | C ⊏∼D ∈ DKBinf} is the
defeasible subsumption relation induced by KBinf.
So, the DTBox induced by KBinf is the set of defeasible subsumption statements con-
tained in KBinf, together with the defeasible versions of the classical subsumption state-
ments in KBinf. The defeasible subsumption relation induced by KBinf is simply the defea-
sible subsumption relation corresponding to DKBinf.
Definition 13 A defeasible theory KBinf is called preferential if the subsumption relation
induced by it satisfies the preferential properties in Definition 4.
It turns out that the defeasible subsumption relation induced by the preferential closure
of a defeasible knowledge base KB is exactly the intersection of the defeasible subsumption
relations induced by the preferential defeasible theories containing KB.
Lemma 4 Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. Then
⊏∼ KB∗pref =
⋂
{⊏∼ KBinf | KB ⊆ KBinf and KBinf is preferential}.
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It follows immediately that the preferential closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB
is preferential, and induces the smallest defeasible subsumption relation induced by a
preferential defeasible theory containing KB.
Preferential entailment is not always desirable, one of the reasons being that it is
monotonic, courtesy of the Tarskian notion of consequence it relies on (see Definition 10).
In most cases, as witnessed by the great deal of work in the non-monotonic reasoning
community, a move towards rationality is in order. Thanks to the definitions above and
the result in Theorem 2, we already know where to start looking for it.
Definition 14 (Modular Entailment) A statement α is modularly entailed by a de-
feasible knowledge base KB, written KB |=mod α, if every modular model of KB satisfies α.
As is the case for preferential entailment, modular entailment is accompanied by a
corresponding notion of closure.
Definition 15 (Modular Closure) Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. With KB∗mod =def
{α | KB |=mod α} we denote the modular closure of KB.
Definition 16 A defeasible theory KBinf is called rational if it is preferential and ⊏∼KBinf
is also closed under the rational monotonicity rule (RM).
For modular closure we get a result similar to Lemma 4.
Lemma 5 Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. Then
⊏∼ KB∗mod =
⋂
{⊏∼ KBinf | KB ⊆ KBinf and KBinf is rational}.
That is, the modular closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB induces the smallest
defeasible subsumption relation induced by a rational defeasible theory containing KB.
However, the modular closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB is not necessarily rational.
That is, if one looks at the set of statements (in particular the ⊏∼ -ones) modularly entailed
by a knowledge base as a defeasible subsumption relation, then it need not satisfy the
rational monotonicity property. This is so because modular entailment coincides with
preferential entailment, as the following result, adapted from a well-known similar result
in the propositional case [59, Theorem 4.2], shows.
Lemma 6 KB∗mod = KB
∗
pref .
As a result, modular entailment unfortunately falls short of providing us with an ap-
propriate notion of non-monotonic entailment. In what follows, we overcome precisely this
issue.
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4.2 Semantic rational entailment
In this section, we introduce a definition of semantic entailment which, as we shall see, is
appropriate in the light of the discussion above. The constructions we are going to present
are inspired by the semantic characterisation of rational closure by Booth and Paris [15]
in the propositional case. We shall give a corresponding proof-theoretic characterisation of
our version of semantic entailment in Section 5.1.
We focus our attention on a subclass of modular orders, referred to as ranked orders :
Definition 17 (Ranked Order) Given a set X, the binary relation ≺ ⊆ X × X is a
ranked order if there is a mapping hR : X −→ N satisfying the following convexity
property:
• for every i ∈ N, if for some x ∈ X hR(x) = i, then, for every j such that 0 ≤ j < i,
there is a y ∈ X for which hR(y) = j,
and s.t. for every x, y ∈ X, x ≺ y iff hR(x) < hR(y).
It is easy to see that a ranked order ≺ is also modular: ≺ is a strict partial order, and,
since two objects x, y are incomparable (i.e., x ∼ y) if and only if hR(x) = hR(y), ∼ is a
transitive relation. By constraining our preference relations to the ranked orders, we can
identify a subset of the modular interpretations we refer to as the ranked interpretations.
Definition 18 (Ranked Interpretation) A ranked interpretation is a modular in-
terpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 s.t. ≺R is a ranked order.
We now provide two basic results about ranked interpretations. First, all finite modular
interpretations are ranked interpretations.
Lemma 7 A modular interpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 s.t. ∆R is finite is a ranked inter-
pretation.
Next, for every ranked interpretation R, the function hR(·) is unique.
Proposition 1 Given a ranked interpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉, there is only one func-
tion hR : X −→ N satisfying the convexity property and s.t. for every x, y ∈ X, x ≺ y iff
hR(x) < hR(y).
Proposition 1 allows us to use the function hR(·) to define the notions of height and
layers.
Definition 19 (Height & Layers) Given a ranked interpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉, its
characteristic ranking function hR(·), and an object x ∈ ∆R, hR(x) is called the height
of x in R.
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For every ranked interpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉, we can partition the domain ∆R
into a sequence of layers (L0, . . . , Ln, . . .), where, for every object x ∈ ∆R, we have x ∈ Li
iff hR(x) = i.
Intuitively, the lower the height of an object in an interpretationR, the more typical (or
normal) the object is inR. We can also think of a level of typicality for concepts: the height
of a concept C ∈ L in R is the index of the layer to which the restriction of the concept’s
extension to its ≺R-minimal elements belong, i.e., hR(C) = i if ∅ ⊂ min≺R C
R ⊆ Li. As a
convention, if min≺R C
R = ∅, that is, if CR = ∅, then hR(C) =∞.
The following result (proved in Appendix D) will be useful for some of the proofs in
later sections of the paper:
Theorem 3 (Finite-Model Property) Defeasible ALC has the finite-model property.
In particular, every defeasible ALC knowledge base that has a modular model, has also a
finite ranked model.
Given a set of ranked interpretations, we can introduce a new form of model merging,
ranked union.
Definition 20 (Ranked Union) Given a countable set of ranked interpretations R =
{R1,R2, . . .}, a ranked interpretation R
R =def 〈∆
R, ·R,≺R〉 is the ranked union of R if
the following holds:
• ∆R =def
∐
R∈R ∆
R, i.e., the disjoint union of the domains from R, where each R ∈ R
has the elements x, y, . . . of its domain renamed as xR, yR, . . . so that they are all
distinct in ∆R;
• xR ∈ A
R iff x ∈ AR;
• (xR, yR′) ∈ rR iff R = R′ and (x, y) ∈ rR;
• for every xR ∈ ∆R, hR(xR) = hR(x).
The latter condition corresponds to imposing that xR ≺R yR′ iff hR(x) < hR′(y).
Informally, the ranked union of a set of ranked interpretations is the result of merging
all their layers of height i into a single layer of height i, for all i.
Lemma 8 Given a set of ranked models of a defeasible knowledge base KB, their ranked
union is itself a ranked model of KB.
Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base and let ∆ be a fixed countably infinite set.
Define
Mod∆(KB) =def {R = 〈∆
R, ·R,≺R〉 | R  KB,R is ranked and ∆R = ∆}.
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The following result shows that the set Mod∆(KB) suffices to characterise modular entail-
ment (the proof is in Appendix D):
Lemma 9 For every KB and every C,D ∈ L, KB |=mod C ⊏∼D iff R  C ⊏∼D, for every
R ∈ Mod∆(KB).
Therefore, we can use just the set of interpretations in Mod∆(KB) to decide the conse-
quences of KB w.r.t. modular entailment.
We can now use the set Mod∆(KB) as a springboard to introduce what will turn out
to be a canonical modular interpretation for KB. Using Mod∆(KB) and ranked union we
can define the following relevant model.
Definition 21 (Big Ranked Model) Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. The big
ranked model of KB is the ranked model O =def 〈∆O, ·O,≺O〉 that is the ranked union of
the models in Mod∆(KB).
Given Lemma 8, we can state the following:
Corollary 1 O is a ranked model of KB.
Armed with the definitions and results above, we are now ready to provide an alternative
definition of entailment in the context of defeasible ontologies:
Definition 22 (Rational Entailment) A statement α is rationally entailed by a knowl-
edge base KB, written KB |=rat α, if O  α.
That such a notion of entailment indeed deserves its name is witnessed by the following
result, a consequence of Corollary 1 and Theorem 2:
Corollary 2 Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. {C ⊏∼D | O  C ⊏∼D} is rational.
In conclusion, rational entailment is a good candidate for the appropriate notion of
defeasible consequence we have been looking for. Of course, a question that arises is
whether a notion of closure, in the spirit of preferential and modular closures, that is
equivalent to it can be defined. In the next section, we address precisely this matter.
5 Rational closure for defeasible knowledge bases
We now turn our attention to the exploration, in a DL setting, of the well-known notion of
rational closure of a defeasible knowledge base as studied by Lehmann and Magidor [59] for
propositional logic. For the most part, we base our constructions on the work by Casini and
Straccia [37, 40], amending it wherever necessary. (An alternative semantic characterisation
of rational closure in DLs has also been proposed by Giordano et al. [51, 52].) As we shall
see, rational closure provides a proof-theoretic characterisation of rational entailment and
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the complexity of its computation is no higher than that of computing entailment in the
underlying classical DL.
5.1 Rational closure and a correspondence result
Rational closure is a form of inferential closure based on modular entailment |=mod, but
it extends its inferential power. Such an extension of modular entailment is obtained by
formalising the already mentioned principle of presumption of typicality [58, Section 3.1].
That is, under possibly incomplete information, we always assume that we are dealing with
the most typical possible situation that is compatible with the information at our disposal.
We first define what it means for a concept to be exceptional, a notion that is central to
the definition of rational closure:
Definition 23 (Exceptionality) Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base and C ∈ L. We
say C is exceptional in KB if KB |=mod ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬C. A DCI C ⊏∼D is exceptional in KB if
C is exceptional in KB.
A concept C is considered exceptional in a knowledge base KB if it is not possible to
have a modular model of KB in which there is a typical object (i.e., an object at least as
typical as all the others) that is in the interpretation of C. Intuitively, a DCI is exceptional
if it does not concern the most typical objects, i.e., it is about less normal (or exceptional)
ones. This is an intuitive translation of the notion of exceptionality used by Lehmann and
Magidor [59] in the propositional framework, and has already been used by Casini and
Straccia [37] and Giordano et al. [52] in their investigations into defeasible reasoning for
description logics.
Applying the notion of exceptionality iteratively, we associate with every concept C a
rank in KB, which we denote by rankKB(C). We extend this to DCIs and associate with
every statement C ⊏∼D a rank, denoted rankKB(C ⊏∼D):
1. Let rankKB(C) = 0, if C is not exceptional in KB, and let rankKB(C ⊏∼ D) = 0 for
every DCI having C in the LHS, with rankKB(C) = 0. The set of DCIs in D with
rank 0 is denoted as Drank0 .
2. Let rankKB(C) = 1, if C does not have a rank of 0 and it is not exceptional in
the knowledge base KB1 composed of T and the exceptional part of D, that is,
KB1 = 〈T ,D \ Drank0 〉. If rankKB(C) = 1, then let rankKB(C ⊏∼D) = 1 for every DCI
C ⊏∼D. The set of DCIs in D with rank 1 is denoted D
rank
1 .
3. In general, for i > 0, a concept C is assigned a rank of i if it does not have a rank of
i − 1 and it is not exceptional in KBi = 〈T ,D \
⋃i−1
j=0D
rank
j 〉. If rankKB(C) = i, then
rankKB(C⊏∼D) = i, for every DCI C⊏∼D having C in the LHS. The set of DCIs in D
with rank i is denoted Dranki .
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4. By iterating the previous steps, we eventually reach a subset E ⊆ D such that all the
DCIs in E are exceptional (since D is finite, we must reach such a point). If E 6= ∅,
we define the rank of the DCIs in E as ∞, and the set E is denoted Drank∞ . Moreover,
we set rankKB(C) =∞ for every C in the LHS of some DCI in Drank∞ .
The notion of rank can also be extended to GCIs as follows: rankKB(C ⊑ D) = rankKB(C ⊓
¬D).
Following on the procedure above, the DTBox D is partitioned into a finite sequence
〈Drank0 , . . . ,D
rank
n ,D
rank
∞ 〉 (n ≥ 0), where D
rank
∞ may possibly be empty. So, through this
procedure we can assign a rank to every DCI.
We can check that for a concept C has a rank of∞ iff it is not satisfiable in any model
of KB, that is, KB |=mod C ⊑ ⊥.
Lemma 10 For every knowledge base KB and every concept C, rankKB(C) = ∞ iff
KB |=mod C ⊑ ⊥.
Example 2 Let KB = T ∪D, where T and D are as in Example 1, i.e., T = {EmpStud ⊑
Student} and
D =


Student⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud⊏∼ ∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud ⊓ Parent⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax


Examining the concepts on the LHS of each DCI in KB, one can verify that Student is not
exceptional w.r.t.KB. Therefore, rankKB(Student) = 0. We also find that rankKB(EmpStud) 6=
0 and rankKB(EmpStud ⊓ Parent) 6= 0 because both concepts are exceptional w.r.t. KB.
Hence Drank0 = {Student⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax} and KB
0 = T ∪ Drank0 .
KB1 is composed of T and D\Drank0 . We find that EmpStud is not exceptional w.r.t. KB
1
and therefore rankKB(EmpStud) = 1. Since EmpStud ⊓ Parent is exceptional w.r.t. KB
1,
rankKB(EmpStud ⊓ Parent) 6= 1. Thus Drank1 = {EmpStud ⊏∼ ∃pays.Tax}. Similarly, KB
2 is
composed of T and {EmpStud ⊓ Parent⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax}. We have that EmpStud ⊓ Parent is
not exceptional w.r.t. KB2 and therefore rankKB(EmpStud ⊓ Parent) = 2. Finally, for this
example, Drank∞ = ∅.
Adapting Lehmann and Magidor’s construction for propositional logic [59], the rational
closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB is defined as follows:
Definition 24 (Rational Closure) Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base and C,D ∈ L.
1. C ⊏∼D is in the rational closure of KB if
rankKB(C ⊓D) < rankKB(C ⊓ ¬D) or rankKB(C) =∞.
2. C ⊑ D is in the rational closure of KB if rankKB(C ⊓ ¬D) =∞.
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Informally, the definition above says that C ⊏∼D is in the rational closure of KB if the
modular models of KB tell us that some instances of C ⊓ D are more plausible than all
instances of C⊓¬D, while C ⊑ D is in the rational closure of KB if the instances of C⊓¬D
are impossible.
Example 2 (continued) Applying the definition above to the knowledge base in Exam-
ple 2, we can verify that Student ⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax is in the rational closure of KB because
rankKB(Student⊓¬∃pays.Tax) = 0 and rankKB(Student⊓∃pays.Tax) > 0. The latter can be
derived from the fact that Student⊓∃pays.Tax is exceptional w.r.t. KB. Similarly, one can
derive that both DCIs EmpStud⊏∼∃pays.Tax and EmpStud⊓Parent⊏∼¬∃pays.Tax are in the
rational closure of KB as well.
We now state the main result of the present section, which provides an answer to the
question raised at the end of Section 4.2. (The proof can be found in Appendix E.)
Theorem 4 Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base having a modular model. A statement
α is in the rational closure of KB iff KB |=rat α.
An easy corollary of this result is that rational closure preserves the equivalence between
GCIs of the form C ⊑ D and their defeasible counterparts (C ⊓ ¬D ⊏∼⊥).
Corollary 3 C ⊑ D is in the rational closure of a defeasible knowledge base KB iff C ⊓
¬D ⊏∼ ⊥ is in the restriction of the closure of KB under rational entailment to defeasible
concept inclusions.
Rational entailment from a knowledge base can therefore be formulated as membership
checking of the rational closure of the knowledge base. Of course, from an application-
oriented point of view, this raises the question of how to compute membership of the
rational closure of a knowledge base, and what is the complexity thereof. This is precisely
the topic of the next section.
5.2 Rational entailment checking
We now present an algorithm to effectively check the rational entailment of a DCI from a
defeasible knowledge base. Our algorithm is a modification of the one given by Casini and
Straccia [37] for defeasible ALC. Their algorithm had to be modified slightly since it does
not always give back the correct result in case Drank∞ 6= ∅ — cf. Item 4 in the description in
Section 5.1.
Let KB = T ∪ D be a defeasible knowledge base. The first step of the algorithm
is to assign a rank to each DCI in D. Central to this step is the exceptionality func-
tion Exceptional(·), which computes the semantic notion of exceptionality of Definition 23.
The function makes use of the notion of materialisation to reduce concept exceptionality
checking to entailment checking:
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Definition 25 (Materialisation) Let D be a set of DCIs. With D =def {¬C ⊔ D |
C ⊏∼D ∈ D} we denote the materialisation of D.
We can show that, given KB = T ∪D and D′ ⊆ D, if T |=
d
D′ ⊑ ¬C, where |= denotes
classical ALC entailment, a DCI C ⊏∼D is exceptional w.r.t. T ∪D
′, thereby justifying the
use of Line 3 of function Exceptional(·). The proof of the following lemma can be found in
Appendix E.
Lemma 11 For KB = T ∪D, if T |=
d
D ⊑ ¬C, then C ⊏∼D is exceptional w.r.t. T ∪D.
Given a set of DCIs D′ ⊆ D, Exceptional(T ,D′) returns a subset E of D′ such that E is
exceptional w.r.t. T ∪ D′.
Function Exceptional(T ,D′)
Input: T and D′ ⊆ D
Output: E ⊆ D′ such that E is exceptional w.r.t. T ∪ D′
1 E := ∅;
2 foreach C ⊏∼D ∈ D
′ do
3 if T |=
d
D′ ⊑ ¬C then
4 E := E ∪ {C ⊏∼D}
5 return E
While the converse of Lemma 11 does not hold, it follows from Lemma 13 below that this
reduction to classical entailment checking, when applied iteratively (lines 4–14 in Algorithm
ComputeRanking(·)), fully captures the semantic notion of exceptionality of Definition 23.
Example 2 (continued) If we feed the knowledge base in Example 2 to the function
Exceptional(·), we obtain the output
E = {EmpStud⊏∼ ∃pays.Tax,EmpStud ⊓ Parent⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax}.
This is because both concepts on the LHS of the DCIs in D′ are exceptional w.r.t. KB in
Example 2.
We now describe the overall ranking algorithm, presented in the function ComputeRanking(·)
below. The algorithm makes a finite sequence of calls to the function Exceptional(·), start-
ing from the knowledge base KB = T ∪ D. The algorithm terminates with a partitioning
of the axioms in the DTBox, from which a ranking of axioms can easily be obtained.
We initialise T ∗ to T and D∗ to D (Lines 1 and 2 of ComputeRanking(·)). We then
repeatedly invoke the function Exceptional(·) to obtain a sequence of sets of DCIs E0, E1, . . .,
where E0 = D
∗ and each Ei+1 is the set of exceptional axioms in Ei (Lines 4–14 of
ComputeRanking(·)).
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Function ComputeRanking(KB)
Input: KB = T ∪ D
Output: KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗, a partitioning R = {D0, . . . ,Dn} for D∗, and an
exceptionality ranking E
1 T ∗ := T ;
2 D∗ := D;
3 R := ∅;
4 repeat
5 i := 0;
6 E0 := D∗;
7 E1 := Exceptional(T ∗, E0);
8 while Ei+1 6= Ei do
9 i := i+ 1;
10 Ei+1 := Exceptional(T ∗, Ei);
11 D∗∞ := Ei;
12 T ∗ := T ∗ ∪ {C ⊑ D | C ⊏∼D ∈ D
∗
∞};
13 D∗ := D∗ \ D∗∞;
14 until D∗∞ = ∅;
15 E := (E0, . . . , Ei−1);
16 return (KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗, E);
Now, let CD∗ =def {C | C⊏∼D ∈ D
∗}, i.e., CD∗ is the set of all antecedents of DCIs in D∗.
The exceptionality ranking of the DCIs in D∗ computed by Exceptional(·) makes use of T ∗,
D∗, and CD∗ . That is, it checks, for each concept C ∈ CD∗ , whether T ∗ |=
d
D∗ ⊑ ¬C. In
case C is exceptional, every DCI C ⊏∼D ∈ D
∗ is exceptional w.r.t. KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗ and is
added to the set E1.
If E1 6= E0, then we call Exceptional(·) for T ∗∪E1, defining the set E2, and so on. Hence,
given KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗, we construct a sequence E0, E1, . . . in the following way:
• E0 := D∗;
• Ei+1 := Exceptional(T ∗, Ei), for i ≥ 0.
Example 2 (continued) Using the knowledge base of Example 2, we initialise T ∗ =
{EmpStud ⊑ Student} and
D∗ =


Student⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud⊏∼ ∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud ⊓ Parent⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax

 .
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We then obtain the following exceptionality sequence:
E0 =


Student ⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud⊏∼ ∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud ⊓ Parent⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax


E1 =
{
EmpStud⊏∼ ∃pays.Tax,
EmpStud ⊓ Parent⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax
}
E2 = {EmpStud ⊓ Parent⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax}
Since D∗ is finite, the construction will eventually terminate with a fixed point Efix =
Exceptional(T ∗, Efix). If this fixed point is non-empty, then the axioms in there are said
to have infinite rank. We therefore set D∗∞ =def Efix (Line 11 of ComputeRanking(·)), and
the classical translations of these axioms are moved to the TBox. Hence we redefine the
knowledge base in the following way (Lines 12 and 13 of ComputeRanking(·)):
• T ∗ := T ∗ ∪ {C ⊑ D | C ⊏∼D ∈ D
∗
∞};
• D∗ := D∗ \ D∗∞.
Function ComputeRanking(·) must terminate since D is finite, and at every iteration,
D∗ becomes smaller (hence, we have at most |D| iterations). In the end, we obtain a
knowledge base KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗ which is modularly equivalent to the original knowledge
base KB = T ∪ D (see Lemma 12 below), in which D∗ has no DCIs of infinite rank (all
the classical knowledge implicit in the DTBox has been moved to the TBox). We say that
such a knowledge base is in rank normal form.
We also obtain a final exceptionality sequence E = (E0, E1, . . . , Ei−1) (see Line 15 of
ComputeRanking(·)). Given E , it is possible to partition the set D∗ into the sets D0, . . . ,Dn,
for some n = i− 1 ≥ 0:
• For every j, 0 ≤ j ≤ n, Dj := Ej \ Ej+1;
• R := (D0, . . . ,Dn).
The sequence R is a partition of the DTBox according to the level of exceptionality of
each defeasible inclusion in it.
Example 2 (continued) ForKB as in Example 2, we obtain the partitionR = {D0,D1,D2},
where D0 = {Student⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax}, D1 = {EmpStud⊏∼ ∃pays.Tax} and D2 = {EmpStud ⊓
Parent⊏∼ ¬∃pays.Tax}.
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At this stage, we have moved all the classical information implicit the DTBox to the
TBox, and ranked all the remaining DCIs, where the rank of a DCI is the index of the
unique partition to which it belongs, defined as follows:
Definition 26 (Ranking) For every C,D ∈ L:
• rk(C) =def i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, if Ei is the first element in the sequence (E0, . . . , En) s.t.
T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ ⊥;
• rk(C) =def ∞, if there is no such Ei;
• rk(C ⊏∼D) =def rk(C).
Remark 1 For every i ≤ j ≤ n, |=
d
Ej ⊑
d
Ei.
Remark 2 For every i < j ≤ n, Di ∩ Dj = ∅.
To summarise, we transform our initial knowledge base KB = T ∪ D, obtaining a
modularly equivalent knowledge base KB∗ = T ∗∪D∗ (see Lemma 12 below) and a ranking
of DCIs in the form of a partitioning ofD∗. The main difference between ComputeRanking(·)
and the analogous procedure by Casini and Straccia [37] is the reiteration of the ranking
procedure until D∗∞ = ∅ (lines 4-14 in ComputeRanking(·)). While the two procedures
behave identically in the case where there are no DCIs C ⊏∼ D s.t. rankKB(C ⊏∼ D) = ∞
in D, the procedure by Casini and Straccia [37] did not handle all the cases correctly in
which there is classical information implicit in the DTBox. Lemma 45 in Appendix E and
Lemma 13 below prove that the procedure here is correct w.r.t. the semantics.
Given the knowledge base KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗, we can now define the main algorithm for
deciding whether a DCI C⊏∼D is in the rational closure of KB. To do that, we use the same
approach as in the function Exceptional(·), that is, given KB∗ = T ∗ ∪D∗ and our sequence
of sets E0, . . . , En, we use the TBox T ∗ and the sets of conjunctions of materialisationsd
E0, . . . ,
d
En.
Definition 27 (Rational Deduction) Let KB = T ∪ D and let C,D ∈ L. We say that
C ⊏∼D is rationally deducible from KB, denoted KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼D, if T
∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓C ⊑ D,
where
d
Ei is the first element of the sequence
d
E0, . . . ,
d
En s.t. T
∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬C. If
there is no such element, KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼D if T
∗ |= C ⊑ D.
Observe that KB ⊢rat C ⊑ D if and only if KB ⊢rat C ⊓ ¬D ⊏∼ ⊥, i.e., if and only if
KB ⊢rat C ⊓ ¬D ⊑ ⊥ (that is to say, T ∗ |= C ⊑ D).
The algorithm corresponding to the steps above is presented in the function RationalClosure(·)
below.
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Function RationalClosure(KB, α)
Input: KB = T ∪ D and a query α = C ⊏∼D.
Output: true if KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼D, false otherwise
1 (KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗, E = (E0, . . . , En)) := ComputeRanking(KB);
2 i := 0;
3 while T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ ⊥ and i ≤ n do
4 i := i+ 1;
5 if i ≤ n then
6 return T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D;
7 else
8 return T ∗ |= C ⊑ D;
Example 2 (continued) Let KB be as in Example 2 and assume we want to check whether
EmpStud ⊏∼ ∃pays.Tax is in the rational closure of KB. Then, the while-loop on Line 2 of
function RationalClosure(·) terminates when i = 1. At this stage,
d
Ei = (¬EmpStud ⊔
∃pays.Tax)⊓(¬EmpStud⊔¬Parent⊔¬∃pays.Tax). Given this, one can check that T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei⊓
C ⊑ ⊥, i.e., {EmpStud ⊑ Student} 6|= (¬EmpStud ⊔ ∃pays.Tax) ⊓ (¬EmpStud ⊔ ¬Parent ⊔
¬∃pays.Tax) ⊓ EmpStud ⊑ ⊥. Finally, it is easy to confirm that T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D, i.e.,
{EmpStud ⊑ Student} 6|= (¬EmpStud ⊔ ∃pays.Tax) ⊓ (¬EmpStud ⊔¬Parent ⊔¬∃pays.Tax)⊓
EmpStud ⊑ ∃pays.Tax.
Before we state the main theorem of this section, we need to establish the correspon-
dence between the ranking function rankKB(·) presented in Section 5.1 in the construction
of the rational closure of KB and linked by Theorem 4 to the definition of rational en-
tailment, and the ranking function rk(·) of Definition 26 used in the above algorithm. We
also need to establish that the normalisation of a knowledge base by our algorithm main-
tains modular equivalence. The proofs of the following lemmas, as well as a number of
prerequisite results, are in Appendix E.
Lemma 12 Let KB = T ∪ D and let KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗ be obtained from KB through
function ComputeRanking(·). Then KB and KB∗ are modularly equivalent.
Lemma 13 For every defeasible knowledge base KB = T ∪D and every C ∈ L, rankKB(C) =
rk(C).
Now we can state the main theorem, which links rational entailment to rational deduc-
tion via Theorem 4. (The proof can be found in Appendix E.)
Theorem 5 Let KB = T ∪D and let C,D ∈ L. Then KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼D iff KB |=rat C ⊏∼D.
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As an immediate consequence, we have that the function RationalClosure(·) is correct
w.r.t. the definition of rational closure in Definition 24.
Corollary 4 Checking rational entailment is exptime-complete.
Hence entailment checking for defeasible ontologies is just as hard as classical subsump-
tion checking.
We conclude this section by noting that although rational closure is viewed as an ap-
propriate form of defeasible reasoning, it does have its limitations, the first of which is
that it does not satisfy the presumption of independence [58, Section 3.1]. To consider a
well-worn example, suppose we know that birds usually fly and usually have wings, that
both penguins and robins are birds, and that penguins usually do not fly. That is, we have
the following knowledge base: KB = {Bird ⊏∼ Flies,Bird ⊏∼Wings,Penguin ⊑ Bird,Robin ⊑
Bird,Penguin ⊏∼ ¬Flies}. Rational closure allows us to conclude that robins usually have
wings, since they are viewed as typical birds, thereby satisfying the presumption of typical-
ity. But with penguins being atypical birds, rational closure does not allow us to conclude
that penguins usually have wings, thus violating the presumption of independence which,
in this context, would require the atypicality of penguins w.r.t. flying to be independent of
the typicality of penguins w.r.t. having wings.
This deficiency is well-known, and there are other forms of defeasible reasoning that
can overcome this, most notably lexicographic closure [39], relevance closure [35], and
inheritance-based closure [38]. But note that the presumption of independence is proposi-
tional in nature. In fact, the DL version of lexicographic closure is essentially a lifting to
the DL case of a propositional solution to the problem [58].
What is perhaps of more interest is the inability of rational closure to deal with de-
feasibility relating to the non-propositional aspects of descriptions logics. For example,
Pensel and Turhan [63, 64] have shown that rational closure across role expressions does
not always support defeasible inheritance appropriately. Suppose we know that bosses
are workers, do not have workers as their superiors, and are usually responsible. Fur-
thermore, suppose we know that workers usually have bosses as their superiors. We
thus have the knowledge base KB = {Boss ⊑ Worker,Boss ⊑ ¬∃hasSuperior.Worker,
Boss⊏∼Responsible,Worker⊏∼∃hasSuperior.Boss}. Since workers usually have bosses as their
superiors, and bosses are usually responsible, one would expect to be able to conclude that
workers usually have responsible superiors. But rational closure is unable to do so. From
the perspective of the algorithm for rational closure, this can be traced back to the use
of materialisation (Definition 25) when computing exceptionality, as Pensel and Turhan
show. A more detailed semantic explanation for this inability is still forthcoming, though.
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6 Related work
In a sense, the first investigations on non-monotonic reasoning in DL-based systems date
back to the work by Brewka [17] and Cadoli et al. [34]. Other early proposals to introduce
default-style rules into description logics include the work by Baader and Hollunder [2, 3],
Padgham and Zhang [62] and Straccia [74], which are essentially based on Reiter’s default
logic [68].
Quantz and Royer [66] were probably the first to consider lifting the preferential ap-
proach to a DL setting. They propose a general framework for Preferential Default De-
scription Logics (PDDL) based on an ALC-like language by introducing a version of default
subsumption and proposing a preferential semantics for it. Their semantics is based on a
simplified version of standard DL interpretations. They assume all domains to be finite,
which means their framework is much more restrictive than ours in this aspect. They
also allow for the use of object names (something we don’t do), and assume that the
unique-name assumption holds for object names.
They focus on a version of entailment which they refer to as preferential entailment,
but which is to be distinguished from the version of preferential entailment that we have
presented in this paper. In what follows, we shall refer to their version as QR-preferential
entailment.
QR-preferential entailment is concerned with what ought to follow from a set of DL
statements, together with a set of default subsumption statements, and is parameterised by
a fixed partial order on (simplified) DL interpretations. (I.e., the ordering is on the set of DL
interpretations, not on the elements of their respective domains.) They prove that any QR-
preferential entailment satisfies the properties of a preferential consequence relation and,
with some restrictions on the partial order, satisfies rational monotonicity as well. QR-
preferential entailment can therefore be viewed as something in between the notions of
preferential entailment (or modular entailment) and rational entailment. It is also worth
noting that although QR-preferential entailment satisfies the properties of a preferential
consequence relation, Quantz and Royer do not prove that QR-preferential entailment
provides a characterisation of preferential consequence in the spirit of the representation
results we have shown here.
Closely related to our work is that of Giordano et al. [49, 51] who use preferential order-
ings on ∆I to define a typicality operator T(·) on ALC concepts such that the expression
T(C) ⊑ D corresponds to our C ⊏∼ D. They provide a version of a representation result
for preferential orderings in terms of properties on selection functions (functions on the
power set of the domain of interpretations), but not a representation result along the lines
of those we have shown here. In the same work, the authors define a tableaux calculus for
computing preferential entailment that relies on KLM-style rules.
Recently [52], Giordano and colleagues extended the aforementioned work by consider-
ing modular orderings on ∆I (i.e., modular interpretations) and then augment the infer-
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ential power of their system with a version of a minimal-model semantics, in which some
modular interpretations are preferred over others. This is similar in intuition to rational
entailment, but their approach also has a circumscriptive flavour to it (see below) since
it relies on the specification of a set of concepts for which atypical instances must be
minimised.
Outside the family of preferential systems, there are mature proposals based on circum-
scription for DLs [9, 10, 72]. The main drawback of these approaches is the burden on the
ontology engineer to make appropriate decisions related to the (circumscriptive) fixing and
varying of concepts and the priority of defeasible subsumption statements. Such choices
can have a major effect on the conclusions drawn from the system, and can easily lead to
counter-intuitive inferences. Moreover, the use of circumscription usually implies a con-
siderable increase in computational complexity w.r.t. the underlying monotonic entailment
relation. The comparison between the present work and proposals outside the preferential
family is more an issue about the pros and cons of the different kinds of non-monotonic
reasoning, rather than about their DL re-formulation. As stated in the introduction, the
preferential approach has a series of desirable qualities that, to our knowledge, no other
approach to non-monotonic reasoning shares.
A more recent proposal is the approach by Bonatti et al. [8, 11], which introduces a
normality operator N(·) on concepts. The resulting system, DLN , is not based on the
preferential approach, though, and as a consequence their closure operation does not allow
defeasible subsumption to satisfy the preferential properties, but it satisfies some interesting
properties on the meta-level. It also has the advantage of being computationally tractable
for any tractable classical DL.
Lukasiewicz [60] proposes probabilistic versions of the description logics SHIF (D) and
SHOIN (D). As a special case of these logics, he obtains a version of a logic with defeasible
subsumption with a semantics based on that of the propositional version of lexicographic
closure [58].
Casini and Straccia [37] define KLM-based decision procedures forALC. Their proposal
has a syntactic characterisation, but lacks an appropriate semantics, a deficiency that the
present paper comes to remedy. The semantic approach presented here can be extended
also to other forms of entailment proposed by them [38, 39, 40], and recently Casini,
Straccia and Meyer have used it also to characterise a decision procedure for defeasible
EL⊥ [41].
Britz and Varzinczak [26, 30, 31] explore the notion of defeasible modalities, with which
defeasible effects of actions, defeasible knowledge, obligations and others can be formalised
and given an intuitive preferential semantics. Their approach differs from ours in that they
consider preferential entailment only, but the semantic constructions are similar. This was
recently extended [19] to a notion of defeasible role restrictions in a DL setting. The idea
comprises extending the language of ALC with an additional construct
∨
∼. The semantics
of a concept
∨
∼r.C =def {x ∈ ∆P | min≺P r
P(x) ⊆ CP} is then given by all objects of ∆P
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such that all of their minimal r-related objects are C-instances. This is useful in situations
where certain classical concept descriptions may be too strong.
Recently, Britz and Varzinczak have lifted the preferential semantics to also allow for
orderings on role-interpretations [27, 29] that, in turn, induce multi-orderings on objects of
the domain [28, 32]. The latter give us the handle needed to introduce a notion of context
in defeasible subsumption relations making typicality a relativised construct. The former
provides a semantics for defeasible role inclusions of the form r ⊏∼ s and for defeasible role
assertions such as “r is usually transitive”, “r and s are usually disjoint”, as well as others.
Finally, there is the recent work of Pensel and Turhan [63, 64] mentioned in Section 5.2,
the aim of which is to extend both rational closure and relevance closure with defeasible
inheritance across role expressions in the description logic EL⊥. With their work being
restricted to EL⊥, the semantics they propose is based on a form of canonical model similar
to those frequently used for the EL family of DLs, and is therefore quite different from
ours. A detailed comparison of their semantics with the one we provide in this paper is
left as future work.
7 Concluding remarks
The main contributions of the work reported in the present paper can be summarised as
follows:
1. The analysis of a simple and intuitive semantics for defeasible subsumption in de-
scription logics that is general enough to constitute the core framework within which
to investigate non-monotonic extensions of DLs;
2. A characterisation of preferential and rational subsumption relations, with the re-
spective representation results, evidencing the fact that our semantic constructions
are appropriate;
3. An investigation of what an appropriate notion of entailment in a defeasible DL
context means and the analysis of a suitable candidate, namely rational entailment,
and
4. The formal connection between rational entailment, the notion of rational closure
and an algorithm for its computation.
With regard to point 4 above, the main advantages of our approach are as follows: (i) it
relies completely on classical entailment, i.e., entailment checking over defeasible ontologies
can be reduced to a number of classical entailment checks over a rewritten ontology, (ii) it
has computational complexity that is no worse than that of entailment checking in the
classical underlying DL, and (iii) it is easily implementable, e.g. as a Protégé plugin3,
3https://github.com/kodymoodley/defeasibleinferenceplatform
29
of which the performance has been shown to scale well in practice [36]. In a companion
paper [18] the framework described here is extended to include ABox reasoning, with more
extensive experimental results confirming the initial promising results on scalability.
Further topics for future research include the integration of notions such as typicality for
both concepts and roles [12, 13, 14, 49, 51, 75] and role-based defeasible constructors [27,
29, 32, 33] into the framework here presented. Another avenue for future exploration is
the study of belief revision for DLs via our results for rationality, somewhat mimicking the
well-known connection between belief revision and rational consequence in the propositional
case [45], thereby pushing the frontiers of theory change in logics that are more expressive
than the propositional one.
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A Proofs of lemmas in Section 3.2
NB: The results marked (∗) are introduced here in the Appendix, while they are omitted
in the main text.
Lemma 2 For every preferential interpretation P, and every C,D ∈ L, P  C ⊑ D if
and only if P  C ⊓ ¬D ⊏∼⊥.
Proof:
From left to right, P  C ⊑ D implies, by Lemma 1, that (C⊓¬D)P = ∅. The latter implies
that, for every concept E, P  C⊓¬D⊏∼E, and, as a particular case, P  C⊓¬D⊏∼⊥. From
right to left, if P 6 C ⊑ D, then (C ⊓¬D)P 6= ∅. Let x be an object in min≺P (C ⊓¬D)
P :
for P  C ⊓ ¬D ⊏∼⊥, we should have also x ∈ ⊥
P , which is a contradiction.
Definition 28 (Disjoint-Union Preferential Interpretation) Let S be a countable set
and let P = {Ps = 〈∆Ps , ·Ps,≺Ps〉 | s ∈ S} be a collection of preferential interpretations.
The disjoint union of P is a tuple U =def 〈∆
U , ·U ,≺U〉 where:
• ∆U =def {(x, s) | x ∈ ∆Ps and s ∈ S};
• AU =def {(x, s) | x ∈ A
Ps and s ∈ S}, for every A ∈ C;
• rU =def {((x, s), (y, s)) | (x, y) ∈ rPs and s ∈ S}, for every r ∈ R;
• ≺U=def {((x, s), (y, s)) | (x, y) ∈≺Ps and s ∈ S}.
Lemma 14 (∗) Let S and P be as in Definition 28 and let U be the latter’s disjoint union.
For every C ∈ L, every s ∈ S, and every x ∈ ∆Ps, x ∈ CPs if and only if (x, s) ∈ CU .
Proof:
For every s ∈ S, define Es =def {(x, (x, s)) | x ∈ ∆Ps}. We can easily show that Es is a
preferential bisimulation [31] between Ps and U . The lemma is then proved by induction
on the structure of concepts in the usual way [4].
It is easy to see that the following result also holds:
Lemma 15 (∗) Let S and P be as in Definition 28 and let U be the latter’s disjoint
union. For every C ∈ L, every s ∈ S, and every x ∈ ∆Ps, x ∈ min≺Ps C
Ps if and only if
(x, s) ∈ min≺U C
U .
Lemma 3 Preferential interpretations are closed under disjoint union.
Proof:
Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base, let S and P be as in Definition 28 and such that
Ps  KB, for every Ps ∈ P, and let U be the disjoint union of the models in P. We have
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to show that U  KB. Assume that U 6 KB. Then there must be a DCI C ⊏∼ D ∈ KB
(recall Lemma 2) and an object (x, s) ∈ ∆U such that (x, s) ∈ min≺U C
U but (x, s) /∈ DU .
From Lemmas 14 and 15 above, it follows that x ∈ min≺Ps C
Ps and x /∈ DPs , and therefore
Ps 6 C ⊏∼D. Hence, Ps 6 KB, which contradicts our assumption.
B Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 [Representation Result for Preferential Subsumption] A defeasible subsump-
tion relation ⊏∼ ⊆ L×L is preferential if and only if there is a preferential interpretation P
such that ⊏∼ P = ⊏∼ .
B.1 If part
We show that ⊏∼ P is preferential for every preferential interpretation P = 〈∆
P , ·P ,≺P〉.
(Ref): Let x ∈ ∆P be such that x ∈ min≺P C
P . Then clearly x ∈ CP and therefore
P  C ⊏∼ C. Hence C ⊏∼ PC.
(LLE): Assume that C ⊏∼ PE and P  C ≡ D. Then P  C ⊏∼ E, which means
min≺P C
P ⊆ EP . Since P  C ≡ D, i.e., CP = DP , we have min≺P C
P = min≺P D
P .
Hence min≺P D
P ⊆ EP , and therefore P  D ⊏∼ E, from which follows D ⊏∼ PE.
(And): Assume we have both C ⊏∼ PD and C ⊏∼ PE. Then P  C ⊏∼ D and P  C ⊏∼ E,
i.e., min≺P C
P ⊆ DP and min≺P C
P ⊆ EP , and then min≺P C
P ⊆ DP ∩ EP , from which
follows min≺P C
P ⊆ (D ⊓ E)P . Hence P  C ⊏∼D ⊓ E, and therefore C ⊏∼ PD ⊓ E.
(Or): Assume we have both C ⊏∼ PE and D ⊏∼ PE. Let x ∈ min≺P (C ⊔ D)
P . Then x is
minimal in CP ∪DP , and therefore either x ∈ min≺P C
P or x ∈ min≺P D
P . In either case
x ∈ EP . Hence P  C ⊔D ⊏∼ E and therefore C ⊔D ⊏∼ PE.
(RW): Assume we have both C⊏∼PD and P  D ⊑ E. Then P  C⊏∼D, i.e., min≺P C
P ⊆
DP , and DP ⊆ EP . Hence min≺P C
P ⊆ EP and then P  C ⊏∼ E. Therefore C ⊏∼ PE.
(CM): Assume we have both C ⊏∼ PD and C ⊏∼ PE. Then P  C ⊏∼ D and P  C ⊏∼ E,
and therefore min≺P C
P ⊆ DP and min≺P C
P ⊆ EP . Let x ∈ min≺P (C ⊓D)
P . We show
that x ∈ min≺P C
P . Suppose this is not the case. Since ≺P is smooth, there must be
x′ ∈ min≺P C
P such that x′ ≺P x. Because P  C ⊏∼D, x
′ ∈ DP , and then x′ ∈ CP ∩DP ,
i.e., x′ ∈ (C ⊓D)P . From this and x′ ≺P x it follows that x is not minimal in (C ⊓D)P ,
which is a contradiction. Hence x ∈ min≺P C
P . From this and min≺P C
P ⊆ EP , it follows
that x ∈ EP . Hence P  C ⊓D ⊏∼ E, and therefore C ⊓D ⊏∼ PE.
B.2 Only-if part
NB: The results marked (∗) are introduced here in the Appendix, while they are omitted
in the main text.
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Let ⊏∼ ⊆ L×L be a preferential subsumption relation. We shall construct a preferential
interpretation P such that ⊏∼ P =def {(C,D) | P  C ⊏∼D} = ⊏∼ .
Definition 29 Let U =def {(I, x) | I = 〈∆
I , ·I〉 and x ∈ ∆I}.
Intuitively, U denotes the universe of objects in the context of their respective DL
interpretations, i.e., U is a set of first-order interpretations.
Definition 30 A pair (I, x) ∈ U is normal for C ∈ L if for every D ∈ L such that
C ⊏∼D, we have x ∈ D
I.
Lemma 16 (∗) Let ⊏∼ ⊆ L×L satisfy (Ref), (RW) and (And), and let C,D ∈ L. Then
all normal (I, x) for C satisfy D if and only if C ⊏∼D.
Proof:
The if part follows from the definition of normality above. For the only-if part, as-
sume C 6⊏∼D. We build a pair (I, x) that is normal for C but that does not satisfy D.
Let Γ =def {¬D} ∪ {E | C ⊏∼ E}. All we need to do is show that there is (I, x) such that
x ∈ F I for every F ∈ Γ. Suppose this is not the case. Then by compactness there exists
a finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ such that |=
d
F∈Γ′ F ⊑ D. From this follows |= ⊤ ⊑ ¬
d
F∈Γ′ F ⊔ D,
and, in particular, we have |= C ⊑ ¬
d
F∈Γ′ F ⊔ D. Now from (Ref) we have C ⊏∼ C.
From this, |= C ⊑ ¬
d
F∈Γ′ F ⊔ D and (RW) we get C ⊏∼ (¬
d
F∈Γ′ F ⊔ D). But we also
have C ⊏∼
d
F∈Γ′ F by the (And) rule, and then by applying (And) once more we derive
C ⊏∼
d
F∈Γ′ F ⊓ (¬
d
F∈Γ′ F ⊔D). From this and (RW) we conclude C ⊏∼D, from which we
derive a contradiction.
Lemma 17 (∗) If ⊏∼ is preferential, the following rule holds:
C ⊔D ⊏∼ C, D ⊔ E ⊏∼D
C ⊔ E ⊏∼ C
Proof:
The proof is analogous to that by Kraus et al. [56, Lemma 5.5].
Definition 31 Let C,D ∈ L. C ≤ D if C ⊔D ⊏∼ C.
Lemma 18 (∗) If ⊏∼ is preferential, then ≤ is reflexive and transitive.
Proof:
From (Ref) we have C ⊏∼C. This and (LLE) gives us C ⊔C ⊏∼C, therefore we have C ≤ C
and ≤ is reflexive. Transitivity follows from Lemma 17.
Lemma 19 (∗) If ⊏∼ is preferential, the following rule holds:
C ⊔D ⊏∼ C, D ⊏∼ E
C ⊏∼ ¬D ⊔ E
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Proof:
The proof is analogous to that by Kraus et al. [56, Lemma 5.5].
Lemma 20 (∗) If C ≤ D and (I, x) is normal for C, and x ∈ DI, then (I, x) is normal
for D.
Proof:
From C ≤ D we get C ⊔ D ⊏∼ C. Assume that D ⊏∼ E is the case. Then by Lemma 19
we have C ⊏∼ ¬D ⊔ E. Since (I, x) is normal for C, we have x ∈ (¬D ⊔ E)
I . Given that
x ∈ DI , we must have x ∈ EI .
Lemma 21 (∗) If ⊏∼ is preferential, the following rule holds:
C ⊔D ⊏∼ C, D ⊔ E ⊏∼D
C ⊏∼ ¬E ⊔D
Proof:
The proof is analogous to that by Kraus et al. [56, Lemma 5.5].
Lemma 22 (∗) If C ≤ D ≤ E and (I, x) is normal for C, and x ∈ EI , then (I, x) is
normal for D.
Proof:
By Lemma 20, it is enough to show that x ∈ DI . By Lemma 21 we have C ⊏∼ ¬E ⊔ D.
Since (I, x) is normal for C and x ∈ EI , then we must have x ∈ DI .
We now construct a preferential interpretation as in Definition 5.
Let C⊥ =def {C | C ⊏∼ ⊥} and let I =def {I = 〈∆
I , ·I〉 | CI = ∅ for all C ∈ C⊥}.
Intuitively, I contains all interpretations that are ‘compatible’ with ⊏∼ in the sense of not
satisfying concepts that are defeasibly subsumed by the contradiction.
For each I ∈ I , let I+ =def 〈∆I
+
, ·I
+
〉 be such that:
• ∆I
+
=def X
C ∪ X⊥, where XC =def {〈I, x, C〉 | (I, x) is normal for C ∈ L}, and
X⊥ =def {〈I, x,⊥〉 | (I, x) is not normal for any C ∈ L};
• ·I
+
is such that for every D ∈ L, 〈I, x, C〉 ∈ DI
+
if and only if x ∈ DI , and for every
r ∈ R, (〈I, x, C〉, 〈I, y, D〉) ∈ rI
+
if and only if (x, y) ∈ rI .
Let P =def 〈∆P , ·P ,≺P〉 be such that:
• ∆P =def
⋃
I∈I ∆
I+ ;
• ·P =def
⋃
I∈I ·
I+;
• ≺P is the smallest relation such that:
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– For every 〈I, x, C〉 ∈ ∆P such that C 6= ⊥, 〈I, x, C〉 ≺P 〈J , y,⊥〉 for every
〈J , y,⊥〉 ∈ ∆P ;
– For every 〈I, x, C〉, 〈J , y, D〉 ∈ ∆P such that C,D 6= ⊥, 〈I, x, C〉 ≺P 〈J , y, D〉
if and only if C ≤ D and x /∈ DI .
(In the construction of P, note that all pairs (I, x) that are not normal for any concept C
are moved higher up in the ordering so that they correspond to the least preferred objects
of the domain.)
In Lemmas 23 to 28 below we show that P as constructed above is indeed a preferential
interpretation.
Lemma 23 (∗) ∆P 6= ∅.
Proof:
From ⊤ 6⊏∼ ⊥ and Lemma 16, it follows that there is some normal (I, x) for ⊤ that does
not satisfy ⊥. Hence 〈I, x,⊤〉 ∈ ∆P and therefore ∆P 6= ∅.
Lemma 24 (∗) C ≤ ⊥ for every C ∈ L.
Proof:
By (Ref) we have C ⊏∼C. Since |= C ≡ C ⊔⊥, by (LLE) we get C ⊔⊥⊏∼C, and then from
the definition of ≤ follows C ≤ ⊥.
Lemma 25 (∗) ≺P is a strict partial order on ∆P , i.e., ≺P is irreflexive and transitive.
Proof:
First we show irreflexivity. From the construction of ≺P , it clearly follows that for every
〈I, x,⊥〉 ∈ ∆P , 〈I, x,⊥〉 6≺ 〈I, x,⊥〉. Assume that 〈I, x, C〉 ≺P 〈I, x, C〉 for some C 6=
⊥. Then C ≤ C and x /∈ CI , i.e., C ⊔ C ⊏∼ C, and then C ⊏∼ C, by (LLE). This and
x /∈ CI contradicts the fact that (I, x) is normal for C. Hence 〈I, x, C〉 6≺P 〈I, x, C〉 for
every 〈I, x, C〉 ∈ ∆I .
We now show transitivity. Suppose 〈I, x, C〉 ≺P 〈I ′, x′, D〉 and 〈I ′, x′, D〉 ≺P 〈I ′′, x′′, E〉.
From the definition of ≺P we know that C,D 6= ⊥, since all non-normal objects are at the
highest level in the ordering and are all incomparable. We then have C ≤ D and D ≤ E.
(If E = ⊥, we also have D ≤ E by Lemma 24.) From transitivity of ≤ (Lemma 18), we
conclude C ≤ E. Since 〈I, x, C〉 ∈ ∆P and 〈I, x, C〉 ≺P 〈I ′, x′, D〉, we conclude that (I, x)
is normal for C and x /∈ DP . This and Lemma 22 imply that x /∈ EP .
Lemma 26 (∗) Given 〈I, x,D〉 ∈ ∆P , 〈I, x,D〉 ∈ min≺P C
P iff x ∈ CI and D ≤ C.
Proof:
For the if part, suppose that x ∈ CI andD ≤ C. Then it clearly follows that 〈I, x,D〉 ∈ CP
(Lemma 20). Now suppose that 〈I, x,D〉 is not ≺P-minimal in CP , i.e., there is 〈I ′, x′, E〉
41
for some I ′ such that x′ ∈ ∆I
′
and some E ∈ L such that 〈I ′, x′, E〉 ≺P 〈I, x,D〉 and
x′ ∈ CI
′
. From this and the definition of ≺P , it follows that E ≤ D and x′ /∈ DI
′
. Hence
E ≤ D ≤ C and (I ′, x′) is normal for E, and since x′ ∈ CI
′
, by Lemma 22 we get that
(I ′, x′) is normal for D, from which we conclude x′ ∈ DI
′
, a contradiction.
For the only-if part, suppose that 〈I, x,D〉 is ≺P-minimal in CP . Then clearly x ∈ CI .
Now assume there is some (I ′, x′) which is normal for C⊔D and x′ /∈ DI
′
. Since C⊔D ≤ D,
we must have 〈I ′, x′, C ⊔D〉 ≺P 〈I, x,D〉. Since (I ′, x′) is normal for C ⊔D and x′ /∈ DI
′
,
it follows that x′ ∈ CI
′
. This contradicts the minimality of 〈I, x,D〉 in CP . Hence all
normal (I ′, x′) for C ⊔ D satisfy D. From this and Lemma 16 follows C ⊔ D ⊏∼ D, i.e.,
D ≤ C.
Lemma 27 (∗) There is no C ∈ L such that CP 6= ∅ and ⊥ ≤ C.
Proof:
Let C ∈ L be such that CP 6= ∅. Assume that ⊥ ≤ C. Then ⊥ ⊔ C ⊏∼ ⊥, i.e., C ⊏∼ ⊥.
Then C ∈ C⊥, and then CP = ∅ by the construction of P.
Corollary 5 (∗) It follows from the two last lemmas that there is no C ∈ L for which any
〈I, x,⊥〉 ∈ ∆P is minimal.
Lemma 28 (∗) For any C ∈ L, CP is smooth.
Proof:
Suppose that 〈I, x,D〉 ∈ CP , i.e., x ∈ CI . If D ≤ C, then by Lemma 26 〈I, x,D〉 is
≺P-minimal in CP . On the other hand, i.e., if D 6≤ C, C ⊔ D 6⊏∼ D, then by Lemma 16
there is a normal (I ′, x′) for C ⊔ D such that x /∈ DI
′
. But C ⊔ D ⊏∼ C ⊔ D, and then
(C ⊔ D) ⊔ D ⊏∼ C ⊔ D, and then C ⊔ D ≤ D. Hence 〈I
′, x′, C ⊔ D〉 ≺P 〈I, x,D〉. But
x′ ∈ (C ⊔ D)I
′
and x′ /∈ DI
′
, therefore x′ ∈ CI
′
. Since C ⊔ D ≤ C, from Lemma 26 we
conclude that 〈I ′, x′, C ⊔D〉 is ≺P -minimal in CP .
Next we show in Lemma 29 that the abstract relation ⊏∼ we started off with coincides
with the relation ⊏∼ P obtained from our constructed preferential interpretation P.
Lemma 29 (∗) C ⊏∼D if and only if C ⊏∼ PD.
Proof:
For the only-if part, we show that min≺P C
P ⊆ DP . Let 〈I, x, E〉 be ≺P -minimal in CP .
Then (I, x) is normal for E and x ∈ CP , and from Lemma 26 we also have E ≤ C. From
these results and Lemma 20 it follows that (I, x) is normal for C. Since C ⊏∼D, we have
x ∈ DI , and therefore 〈I, x, E〉 ∈ ∆P .
For the if part, let C ⊏∼ PD. From the definition of ≺
P , it follows that for every (I, x)
normal for C, 〈I, x, C〉 ∈ min≺P C
P . Since C ⊏∼ PD, then y ∈ D
I′ for every (I ′, y) that is
normal for C. This and Lemma 16 give us C ⊏∼D.
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Proof of Theorem 1:
Soundness, the if part, is given in Section B.1. For the only-if part, let ⊏∼ be a preferential
subsumption relation and let P be defined as above. Lemmas 23, 25 and 28 show that P is
a preferential DL interpretation. Lemma 29 shows that P defines a subsumption relation
that is exactly ⊏∼ .
C Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2 [Representation Result for Rational Subsumption] A defeasible subsumption
relation ⊏∼ ⊆ L×L is rational if and only if there is a modular interpretation R such that
⊏∼ R = ⊏∼ .
C.1 If part
Satisfaction of the basic KLM properties for preferential subsumption follows from the
proof in Section B.1, given the fact that modular interpretations are a special case of
preferential interpretations. Below we show that rational monotonicity is satisfied.
Assume that C⊏∼RE but C 6⊏∼R¬D. From the latter it follows that there is x ∈ min≺R C
R
such that x ∈ DR, i.e., x ∈ (C ⊓D)R. Let now x′ ∈ min≺R(C ⊓D)
R. Since x ∈ (C ⊓D)R,
x 6≺R x′. This means that x′ ∈ min≺R C
R, for if there is x′′ ∈ CR such that x′′ ≺R x′,
then x′′ ≺R x, which is impossible since x is minimal in CR. From x′ ∈ min≺R C
R and
R  C ⊏∼ E follows x
′ ∈ ER. Hence R  C ⊓D ⊏∼E and therefore C ⊓D ⊏∼ RE.
C.2 Only-if part
NB: The results marked (∗) are introduced here in the Appendix, while they are omitted
in the main text.
The proof of the only-if part relies on the results for the preferential case (Section B.1),
with the main difference being the definition of the preference relation, which is shown
to be a smooth modular order. This ensures that the canonical model constructed in the
proof is a modular interpretation.
Let ⊏∼ ⊆ L × L satisfy all the basic properties of preferential subsumption relations
together with rational monotonicity.
The proof of the following lemma is analogous to that of Lemma 3.11 by Lehmann and
Magidor [59]:
Lemma 30 (∗) If ⊏∼ is rational, then the properties below hold:
C ⊔D ⊏∼ ¬D
C ⊏∼ ¬D
C ⊔ E ⊏∼ ¬C, D ⊔ E 6⊏∼ ¬D
C ⊔D ⊏∼ ¬C
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Definition 32 Let C ∈ L. We say that C is consistent w.r.t. ⊏∼ if C 6⊏∼⊥. Given
R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉, we say that C is consistent w.r.t. ⊏∼ R if C 6⊏∼ R⊥, i.e., if there is
x ∈ ∆R s.t. x ∈ CR.
Let C = {C ∈ L | C is consistent w.r.t. ⊏∼ }.
Lemma 31 (∗) Let C ∈ L and let ⊏∼ be a rational relation. Then C ∈ C iff there is
(I, x) ∈ U s.t. (I, x) is normal for C. (Cf. Definitions 29 and 30 in Appendix B.2.)
Definition 33 Given C,D ∈ C, C is not more exceptional than D, written CRD, if
C ⊔D 6⊏∼ ¬C. We say that C is as exceptional as D, written C ∼ D, if CRD and DRC.
The proof of the lemma below follows those of Lemmas A.4 and A.5 by Lehmann and
Magidor [59]:
Lemma 32 (∗) R is reflexive and transitive.
That ∼ is an equivalence relation follows from the fact that R is reflexive and transi-
tive (Lemma 32). With [C] we denote the equivalence class of C. The set of equivalence
classes of concepts of C under ∼ is denoted by [C]. We write [C] ≤ [D] if CRD, and
[C] < [D] if [C] ≤ [D] and C 6∼ D.
Thanks to Lemma 32 we can state:
Lemma 33 (∗) The relation < is a strict order on [C].
Lemma 34 (∗) Let C,D ∈ L be consistent w.r.t. ⊏∼ . If [C] < [D], then C ⊏∼ ¬D.
Proof:
The assumption implies that CRD is not the case, i.e., C ⊔D⊏∼¬C. This and Lemma 30
imply the conclusion.
Lemma 34 warrants the following result:
Lemma 35 (∗) Let C,D ∈ L be consistent w.r.t. ⊏∼ . If there is (I, x) ∈ U s.t. (I, x) is
normal for C and x ∈ DI , then [D] ≤ [C].
Armed with these results, we can then construct an interpretation R analogous to
the preferential interpretation P in Appendix B.2, with the preference relation defined as
follows:
• For every 〈I, x, C〉 ∈ ∆R such that C 6= ⊥, 〈I, x, C〉 ≺R 〈J , y,⊥〉 for every
〈J , y,⊥〉 ∈ ∆R;
• For every 〈I, x, C〉, 〈J , y, D〉 ∈ ∆R such that C,D 6= ⊥, 〈I, x, C〉 ≺R 〈J , y, D〉 if
[C] < [D].
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It is not hard to see that this definition implies the following result:
Lemma 36 (∗) ≺R is a modular partial order.
The proof of the following lemma follows that of Lehmann andMagidor’s Lemma A.12 [59]:
Lemma 37 (∗) For every C ∈ L, if C is consistent, then CR is smooth.
From this point on, a result analogous to Lemma 29 in B.2 can be shown to hold for
the defeasible subsumption ⊏∼ R induced by R. From that the result follows.
D Proofs of results in Section 4
Lemma 4 Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. Then
⊏∼ KB∗pref =
⋂
{⊏∼ KBinf | KB ⊆ KBinf and KBinf is preferential}.
Proof:
By Definitions 10 and 11, α ∈ KB∗pref iff for every preferential model P of KB, P 
α. Combined with Lemma 2, this implies that, for any defeasible subsumption C ⊏∼ D,
C ⊏∼D ∈ KB
∗
pref iff (C,D) ∈ ⊏∼ P for every preferential model P of KB. Due to Theorem 1,
the latter condition, that is, (C,D) ∈ ⊏∼ P for every preferential model P of KB, holds iff
(C,D) ∈ ⊏∼ KBinf for every preferential theory KBinf containing KB. This concludes the
proof.
Lemma 5 Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base. Then
⊏∼ KB∗mod =
⋂
{⊏∼ KBinf | KB ⊆ KBinf and KBinf is rational}.
Proof:
The proof follows the one of Lemma 4. It is sufficient to refer to Definitions 14 and 15
instead of Definitions 10 and 11, and to Theorem 2 instead of Theorem 1.
Lemma 7 A modular interpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 s.t. ∆R is finite is a ranked inter-
pretation.
Proof:
The preference relation ≺R is a strict partial order, hence, since there cannot be cycles,
for every finite set ∅ 6= X ⊆ ∆R, min≺R X 6= ∅. We can define the function hR(·) in the
following way:
1. ∆R
0
=def ∆
R;
2. i =def 0;
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3. If ∆R
i
6= ∅ proceed, else return the function hR;
4. hR(x) = i iff x ∈ min≺R ∆
Ri ; let ∆R
i+1
=def ∆
Ri \min≺R ∆
Ri ;
5. i =def i+ 1;
6. Go back to step 3.
It is easy to check that hR(·) satisfies the convexity property and characterises ≺R (i.e.,
x ≺R y iff hR(x) < hR(y)).
Proposition 1 Given a ranked interpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉, there is only one func-
tion hR : X −→ N satisfying the convexity property and s.t. for every x, y ∈ X, x ≺ y iff
hR(x) < hR(y).
Proof:
Assume that for a ranked interpretation R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 there are two distinct functions
hR(·) and h′R(·) satisfying the convexity constraint and characterising ≺
R. Since the two
functions are distinct, at a certain point they must diverge; that is, there must be an i ∈ N
s.t. for every k < i and every x ∈ ∆R, hR(x) = k iff h′R(x) = k, but there is a y ∈ ∆
R s.t.
hR(y) = i and h
′
R(y) = j, with j > i. The convexity constraint imposes that there must
be a z ∈ ∆R s.t. h′R(z) = i: then h
′
R(·) enforces z ≺
R y, while according to hR(·) that
cannot be the case (it must be hR(y) ≤ hR(z)).
Some extra material needs to be introduced to prove Theorem 3, stating the Finite
Model Property for Defeasible ALC. First of all, we will refer to the following semantic
construction.
Definition 34 (Finite Model Construction) (∗) Let KB = T ∪D be a finite defeasible
knowledge base, and let R = 〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 be a modular model of KB (with ∆R possibly
infinite). Let C,R be the sets of names of our language, as from Section 2, and Γ be the
set of concepts {C1, . . . , Cn} ⊆ L obtained by closing the set of all concepts appearing in
the axioms in KB under sub-concepts and negation. We define the equivalence relation ≈Γ
as follows: for every x, y ∈ ∆R, x ≈Γ y if for every C ∈ Γ, x ∈ CR iff y ∈ CR.
We indicate with [x]Γ the equivalence class of the objects that are related to an object x
through ≈Γ:
[x]Γ =def {y ∈ ∆
R | x ≈Γ y}
We introduce a new model R′ = 〈∆R
′
, ·R
′
,≺R
′
〉, defined as:
• ∆R
′
= {[x]Γ | x ∈ ∆R};
• For every A ∈ C ∩ Γ, AR
′
= {[x]Γ | x ∈ A
R};
• For every A /∈ C ∩ Γ, AR
′
= ∅;
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• For every r ∈ R, rR
′
= {([x]Γ, [y]Γ) | (x, y) ∈ r
R};
• For every [x]Γ, [y]Γ ∈ ∆R
′
, [x]Γ ≺R
′
[y]Γ if there is an object z ∈ [x]Γ s.t. for all the
objects v ∈ [y]Γ, z ≺R v;
Let ∼R
′
be the indifference relation, defined as usual:
• [x]Γ ∼R
′
[y]Γ if [x]Γ 6≺R
′
[y]Γ and [y]Γ 6≺R
′
[x]Γ.
Given that Γ is finite, ∆R
′
is clearly finite. The following results are easy to prove.
Lemma 38 (∗) For every C ∈ Γ and every x ∈ ∆R, x ∈ CR iff [x]Γ ∈ CR
′
.
Proof:
The proof is analogous to that for the classical case and is by induction on the structure
of concepts.
Lemma 39 (∗) Let ≺R
′
and ≺R be as in Definition 34. Then ≺R
′
is a strict partial order.
Proof:
We show that ≺R
′
is irreflexive and transitive.
Irreflexivity: Assume [x]Γ ≺R
′
[x]Γ. By the definition of ≺R
′
, it implies that there is a
z ∈ [x]Γ s.t. z ≺R v for every v ∈ [x]Γ. That is, we have that z ≺R z that, since ≺R is a
strict partial order (Definitions 5 and 9), cannot be the case.
Transitivity: Assume [x]Γ ≺R
′
[y]Γ and [y]Γ ≺R
′
[u]Γ. This means that there is a z ∈ [x]Γ
s.t. z ≺R v for every v ∈ [y]Γ, and there is a v′ ∈ [y]Γ s.t. v′ ≺R w for every w ∈ [u]Γ.
Since ≺R is transitive, it follows that there is a z ∈ [x]Γ s.t. z ≺R w for every w ∈ [u]Γ,
that is, [x]Γ ≺R
′
[u]Γ.
Lemma 40 (∗) Let ∼R
′
be as in Definition 34. Then relation ∼R
′
is transitive.
Proof:
Let [x]Γ ∼R
′
[y]Γ, [y]Γ ∼R
′
[u]Γ, but [x]Γ 6∼R
′
[u]Γ. The latter implies that either [x]Γ ≺R
′
[u]Γ or [u]Γ ≺
R′ [x]Γ; w.l.o.g. let’s assume [x]Γ ≺
R′ [u]Γ. That is, there is a z ∈ [x]Γ s.t.
z ≺R w for every w ∈ [u]Γ.
[x]Γ ∼R
′
[y]Γ implies that z ∼R v for some v ∈ [y]Γ. Assume the latter does not hold,
then for every v ∈ [y]Γ either z ≺R v or v ≺R z. It cannot be that z ≺R v for every v ∈ [y]Γ,
since that would imply [x]Γ ≺R
′
[y]Γ, so there must be some v ∈ [y]Γ s.t. v ≺R z. However
the latter would also imply, due to the transitivity of ≺R, that there is a v ∈ [y]Γ s.t.
v ≺R w for every w ∈ [u]Γ, that is, [y]Γ ≺R
′
[u]Γ, against the hypothesis that [y]Γ ∼R
′
[u]Γ.
Consequently, z ∼R v for some v ∈ [y]Γ.
So there is a z ∈ [x]Γ s.t. z ≺
R w for every w ∈ [u]Γ and there is a v ∈ [y]Γ s.t. v ∼
R z.
That implies that v ≺R w for every w ∈ [u]Γ. To see it, assume that it not the case, that
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is, we have that for some w′ ∈ [u]Γ either w
′ ≺R v or w′ ∼R v: in the former case we would
obtain z ≺R v, in the latter z ∼R w′, both taking us to contradiction. Hence v ≺R w for
every w ∈ [u]Γ, that is, [y]Γ ≺R
′
[u]Γ, against the hypothesis.
Lemma 41 (∗) Let KB = T ∪D be finite. If KB has a modular model, then it has a finite
ranked model.
Proof:
Let KB = T ∪ D be a finite defeasible knowledge base, R a model of KB and R′ a finite
interpretation constructed from R as in Definition 34. R′ is a finite interpretation, and
it is modular, since Lemmas 39 and 40 prove that ≺R
′
satisfies Definition 8. Being R′ a
finite modular interpretation, it is a finite ranked interpretation (Lemma 7).
It remains to prove that R′ is a model of KB. The proof that R′ satisfies T is straight-
forward by Lemma 38. With regard to D, let C ⊏∼D ∈ D. Since R is a model of D, either
CR = ∅, or the height of C ⊓D in R is lower than the height of C ⊓¬D, that is, there is at
least an object y in (C⊓D)R s.t. for every object x in (C⊓¬D)R, y ≺R x. Since C, D and
¬D are in Γ, the object [y]Γ ∈ ∆R
′
(obtained from y ∈ (C ⊓D)R) must be preferred to all
the objects in (C ⊓¬D)R, that is, [y]Γ ≺R
′
[x]Γ for every object [x]Γ s.t. [x]Γ ∈ (C⊓¬D)R
′
.
Therefore R′  C ⊏∼D.
Lemma 42 (∗) Let KB = T ∪ D be finite and C,D ∈ L. If KB has a modular model
that is a counter-model to C ⊏∼D, then it has a finite ranked model that is a counter-model
to C ⊏∼D.
Proof:
It is sufficient to apply the same construction defined for the finite-model property above.
We just need to add C and D to the set Γ (and close Γ also under the subconcepts of C
and D and their negations). If R 6 C ⊏∼D, then there is an object x s.t. x ∈ (C ⊓ ¬D)
R
and x ≺R y or x ∼R y for every object y s.t. y ∈ (C ⊓ D)R. That implies that in R′
[y]Γ 6≺R′ [x]Γ, that is, [x]Γ ≺R′ [y]Γ or [x]Γ ∼R′ [y]Γ for every y s.t. y ∈ (C ⊓ D)R, and
consequently R′ 6 C ⊏∼D.
Corollary 6 (∗) Let KB = T ∪ D be a finite defeasible knowledge base. If KB has a
modular model R, then for every C ∈ L s.t. hR(C) = 0 there is also a finite ranked
model R′ of KB s.t. hR′(C) = 0.
Proof:
Given KB = T ∪ D, a model R of KB and a concept C s.t. hR(C) = 0, a finite model R
′
satisfying the constraint above can be defined in the same way as the model R′ from
Definition 34. We just need to add C to the set Γ (and close Γ also under the subconcepts
of C and their negations). To see that R′ is a model of KB, just go again through the
proof of the finite-model property above, and check that the addition of C to Γ does not
affect any of the above results.
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Now, hR(C) = 0 implies that there is an object x ∈ ∆
R s.t. x ∈ CR and hR(x) = 0.
Consider now [x]Γ. By Lemma 38, [x]Γ ∈ CR
′
. Since hR(x) = 0, for every [y]Γ ∈ ∆R
′
it
cannot be the case that there is an object z ∈ [y]Γ s.t. z ≺R v for every v ∈ [x]Γ; hence,
the definition of ≺R
′
implies that for every [y]Γ ∈ ∆R
′
, [y]Γ 6≺R
′
[x]Γ, that is, hR′([x]Γ) = 0,
that implies hR′(C) = 0.
Now we can prove Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 (Finite-Model Property) Defeasible ALC has the finite-model property.
In particular, every defeasible ALC knowledge base that has a modular model, has also a
finite ranked model.
Proof:
The result follows straightforwardly from Lemmas 41 and 42.
Lemma 8 Given a set of ranked models of a defeasible knowledge base KB, their ranked
union is itself a ranked model of KB.
Proof:
Let R be a set of ranked models of a defeasible knowledge base KB, and let RR =def
〈∆R, ·R,≺R〉 be its ranked union. We want to prove that also RR is a ranked model of
KB, and to do that is sufficient to prove that for every DCI C ⊏∼D, if R  C⊏∼D for every
R ∈ R, then RR  C ⊏∼D.
It is easy to prove by induction on the construction of the concepts that for every object
xR ∈ ∆
R and every concept C, xR ∈ C
R iff x ∈ CR.
This, together with the condition that, for every xR ∈ ∆R, hR(xR) = hR(x), implies
that for every concept C, hRR(C) = min{hR(C) | R ∈ R
R}.
Now, let C⊏∼D be satisfied by everyR ∈ R. Hence, for everyR ∈ R, either hR(C⊓D) <
hR(C ⊓ ¬D) or hR(C) = ∞. Since hRR(C) = min{hR(C) | R ∈ R
R}, hRR(C ⊓ D) =
min{hR(C ⊓D) | R ∈ R
R}, and hRR(C ⊓ ¬D) = min{hR(C ⊓ ¬D) | R ∈ R
R}, it is easy
to check that RR satisfies C⊏∼D too: assume that is not the case, that is, hRR(C ⊓¬D) ≤
hRR(C ⊓ D) and hRR(C) < ∞; then we have that min{hR(C ⊓ ¬D) | R ∈ R
R} ≤
min{hR(C ⊓D) | R ∈ R
R} and min{hR(C) | R ∈ R
R} <∞, that, since for every R ∈ R,
either hR(C ⊓D) < hR(C ⊓ ¬D) or hR(C) =∞, cannot be the case.
Lemma 9 For every KB and every C,D ∈ L, KB |=mod C ⊏∼D iff R  C ⊏∼D, for every
R ∈ Mod∆(KB).
Proof:
Let ∆ be a countably infinite domain. For the only-if part, if KB |=mod C ⊏∼ D, then
obviously R  C ⊏∼D for every R ∈ Mod∆(KB). For the if part, assume KB 6|=mod C ⊏∼D.
Then, thanks to the finite-model property (Theorem 3), there is a modular model Rfin with
a finite domain that is a model of KB and a counter-model of C ⊏∼D; since the domain is
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finite, the modular model Rfin is a ranked model (Lemma 7). Given Rfin, we can extend
it to a model of KB that is a counter-model of C ⊏∼ D with a countably infinite domain
in the following way: make a countably infinite number of copies of Rfin and make the
ranked union of them. Now, let R′ = 〈∆R
′
, ·R
′
,≺R
′
〉 be the result of such ranked union,
that is, a ranked model of KB and a counter-model of C ⊏∼ D with ∆
R′ being countably
infinite (it is the disjoint union of a countably infinite number of finite domains). It is easy
to build an isomorphic interpretation R = 〈∆, ·R,≺R〉, once we have defined a bijection
b : ∆R
′
−→ ∆, which must exist, being both ∆R
′
and ∆ countably infinite sets. We can
define ·R and ≺R in the following way:
• For every A ∈ C and every x ∈ ∆R
′
, b(x) ∈ AR iff x ∈ AR
′
;
• For every r ∈ R and every x, y ∈ ∆R
′
, (b(x), b(y)) ∈ rR iff (x, y) ∈ rR
′
;
• For every x ∈ ∆R
′
, hR(b(x)) = hR′(x).
It is easy to prove by induction on the construction of the concepts that for every
C ∈ L and every x ∈ ∆R
′
, x ∈ CR
′
iff b(x) ∈ CR. Moreover, x ∈ min≺R′ (C
R′) iff
b(x) ∈ min≺R(C
R). Hence, there is a ranked KB-model which is a counter model for
C ⊏∼D with ∆ as its domain.
E Proofs of results in Section 5
NB: The results marked (∗) are introduced here in the Appendix, while they are omitted
in the main text.
Lemma 10 For every knowledge base KB and every concept C, rankKB(C) = ∞ iff
KB |=mod C ⊑ ⊥.
Proof:
If KB does not have a modular model or C is never satisfiable, then the result is straight-
forward. Let KB = T ∪ D have a modular model, and let C be satisfiable. Also, let D be
ranked into 〈Drank0 , . . . ,D
rank
n ,D
rank
∞ 〉.
From left to right, let rankKB(C) =∞ but KB 6|=mod C ⊑ ⊥. Together they imply that
T ∪Drank∞ |=mod ⊤⊏∼¬C but T ∪D
rank
∞ 6|=mod C ⊑ ⊥. Hence, due to the FMP (Theorem 3),
there is a finite ranked modelR of T ∪Drank∞ with the domain ∆
R layered into (LR0 , . . . , L
R
n ),
and s.t. R  ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬C but R 6 C ⊑ ⊥, that is, in ∆
R there is an object o s.t. o ∈ LRi ,
with 0 < i ≤ n, and o ∈ CR.
Now let’s define a new model R′ simply taking the lower layer and putting it at the
“top” of our model, that is, we rearrange the interpretation in the following way:
• ∆R
′
= ∆R;
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• ·R
′
= ·R;
• LR
′
n = L
R
0 ;
• for every i < n, LR
′
i = L
R
i+1.
Clearly for every concept D, DR
′
= DR (it is easy to prove by induction on the
construction of the concepts), and consequently R′ is still a model of T . We can prove
that is still also a model of Drank∞ . Assume that is not the case, that is, there is a some
D⊏∼E ∈ D
rank
∞ s.t. R  D⊏∼E andR
′ 6 D⊏∼E. R  D⊏∼E if either hR(D⊓E) < hR(D⊓¬E)
or hR(D) =∞. It cannot be the latter, since hR(D) =∞ corresponds to DR = ∅, and we
would have also DR
′
= ∅ and hR′(D) =∞. Hence it must be hR(D ⊓ E) < hR(D ⊓ ¬E),
while hR(D ⊓ E) 6< hR(D ⊓ ¬E). Let hR(D ⊓ E) = i and hR(D ⊓ ¬E) = j with i < j. If
i > 0, then hR′(D ⊓E) = i− 1 and hR′(D ⊓¬E) = j − 1, and hR′(D ⊓E) < hR′(D ⊓¬E)
again; hence it must be hR(D ⊓E) = 0, that is, hR(D) = 0, but that is incompatible with
D ⊏∼ E ∈ D
rank
∞ , since T ∪ D
rank
∞ |=mod ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬D, that is, hR(D) > 0. Consequently, R
′ too
must be a model of T ∪ Drank∞ .
We have assumed that in R there is an object o s.t. o ∈ CR and o ∈ LRi for some
0 < i ≤ n. Repeating the procedure used to define R′ for i times, we obtain a model
R∗ of T ∪ Drank∞ s.t. o ∈ C
R∗ and o ∈ LR
∗
0 . However, since rankKB(C) = ∞ implies
T ∪Drank∞ |=mod ⊤⊏∼¬C, this cannot be the case. We conclude that if rankKB(C) =∞ then
KB |=mod C ⊑ ⊥.
From right to left, let KB |=mod C ⊑ ⊥ but rankKB(C) 6= ∞. The latter implies that
there is a model of T ∪Drank∞ that does not satisfy ⊤⊏∼¬C, that is, does not satisfy C ⊑ ⊥.
Referring again to the FMP (Theorem 3), we can say that there is a finite ranked model
R of T ∪ Drank∞ that does not satisfy C ⊑ ⊥. Let k be the number of layers in R.
Now consider T ∪ (Drankn ∪ D
rank
∞ ). For each D ⊏∼ E ∈ D
rank
n there must be a model in
which D ⊓ E is not exceptional, that is, it is satisfied in the layer 0. As a consequence,
still using the FMP (Corollary 6), for each D⊏∼E ∈ D
rank
n there must a finite ranked model
RD ⊏∼ E of T ∪ (D
rank
n ∪ D
rank
∞ ) s.t. hRD ⊏∼ E(D
⊏∼E) = 0.
Build a ranked interpretation Rn as follows:
• for every D⊏∼E ∈ D
rank
n , let RD ⊏∼E be a finite ranked model of T ∪ (D
rank
n ∪D
rank
∞ ) in
which hRD ⊏∼ E(D
⊏
∼ E) = 0.
• Let R′ = 〈∆R
′
, ·R
′
,≺R
′
〉 be the ranked union of such sets. R′ is a model of Drankn
(Lemma 8) s.t. for every D⊏∼E ∈ D
rank
n , hRD ⊏∼ E(D
⊏∼E) = 0. Since D
rank
n is finite, it
has been obtained from a finite set of finite models and so it is a finite ranked model.
Let m be the number of layers in R′.
• From R′ and R define a finite ranked interpretation Rn = 〈∆Rn , ·Rn,≺Rn〉 as:
– ∆Rn = ∆R ∪∆R
′
;
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– ARn = AR ∪AR
′
for every A ∈ C;
– rRn = rR ∪ rR
′
for every r ∈ R;
– for every i ≤ m, LRni = L
R′
i ;
– for every m < i ≤ (m+ k), LRni = L
R
(i−(m+1)).
Informally, we build the model Rn by adding R on top of R′. It is easy to prove by
induction on the construction of the concepts that every object in Rn satisfies a concept
D iff it satisfies D also in the original model, R or R′. As a consequence, Rn 6 C ⊑ ⊥.
Also, it is easy to prove that Rn is a model of T ∪ (D
rank
n ∪ D
rank
∞ ): R
′ is a model of Drankn
with at layer 0 an object satisfying D ⊓E for each D⊏∼E ∈ D
rank
n , and both R and R
′ are
models of T ∪ Drank∞ .
Now consider T ∪ (Drank(n−1)∪D
rank
n ∪D
rank
∞ ). Using the same procedure defined for Rn we
can build a model Rn−1, obtained doing the ranked union of a finite set of finite models of
T ∪ (Drank(n−1) ∪ D
rank
n ∪ D
rank
∞ ) and adding on top Rn. Rn−1 will be a finite ranked model of
T ∪ (Drank(n−1) ∪ D
rank
n ∪ D
rank
∞ ) s.t. Rn−1 6 C ⊑ ⊥.
We can go on with this procedure until we define a finite ranked model R0 of T ∪
(Drank0 ∪ . . .∪D
rank
n ∪D
rank
∞ ). That is, R0 is a model of T ∪D s.t. R0 6 C ⊑ ⊥, against the
hypothesis that KB |=mod C ⊑ ⊥.
In order to prove Theorem 4, we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 43 (*) Let KB = T ∪ D be a defeasible knowledge base having a modular model,
O its big ranked model, and ∆ the countably infinite domain used to define O. For every
C ⊏∼D ∈ D, rankKB(C ⊓D) = i iff there is a model R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB) s.t. hR∆(C ⊓D) = i.
Proof:
First of all, we observe that the exceptionality function in Definition 23 is correctly captured
in the model O, that is, for every C ∈ L, KB |=mod ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬C iff O  ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬C. Indeed,
by Lemma 9, a concept C is exceptional w.r.t. KB iff R∆  ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬C, for every R∆ ∈
Mod∆(KB), which immediately corresponds to O  ⊤⊏∼ ¬C.
Since R∆  KB for every R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB), if hR∆(C) = i, it is immediate that
rankKB(C) ≤ i, otherwise it would be hR∆(C) > i for every R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB). We have to
prove that for every C ⊏∼ D ∈ D, if rankKB(C ⊓ D) = i, then there is a R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB)
s.t. hR∆(C ⊓ D) = i. In case i = ∞, Lemma 10 guarantees that if rankKB(C ⊓ D) = ∞,
then for all the R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB), hR∆(C ⊓ D) = ∞. In case i < ∞, we can prove it by
induction on the ranking value i.
Let C ⊏∼ D ∈ D, and let rankKB(C ⊓ D) = i. For i = 0, we already have all that is
needed to prove that there is a R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB) s.t. R∆ 6 ⊤⊏∼ ¬(C ⊓D):
• rankKB(C ⊓D) = 0 iff KB 6|=mod ⊤⊏∼ ¬(C ⊓D) (Definition 23);
• KB 6|=mod ⊤⊏∼ ¬(C ⊓D) iff there is a R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB) s.t. R∆ 6 ⊤⊏∼ ¬(C ⊓D) (by
Lemma 9);
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• R∆ 6 ⊤⊏∼ ¬(C ⊓D) iff hR∆(C ⊓D) = 0.
For i > 0, we can define a modular model R of KB as follows:
Let C⊏∼D ∈ D with rankKB(C ⊓D) = i, and let D
rank
≥i be the subset of D containing the
DCIs with a ranking value of at least i, and Drank<i = D \D
rank
≥i . Let R
′ be a modular model
of T ∪Drank≥i such that hR′(C ⊓D) = 0. Such a model must exist, since rankKB(C ⊓D) = i,
that is, C ⊓D is not exceptional in T ∪Drank≥i . We can assume that R
′ has a finite domain,
given the finite-model property (Corollary 6), and hence it is a ranked model (Lemma 7).
For each DCI D ⊏∼ E ∈ D
rank
<i , that is, such that rankKB(D ⊓ E) = j for some j < i,
let RD⊓E ∈ Mod∆(KB) be a model of KB satisfiying D ⊓ E s.t. hRD⊓E(D ⊓ E) = j. The
induction hypothesis guarantees that such a model exists for each such DCI.
Now we define a new interpretation R′′ = 〈∆R
′′
, ·R
′′
,≺R
′′
〉 in the following way:
• ∆R
′′
= ∆R
′
∪
⋃
(C ⊏∼D∈D
rank
<i
)∆
RC⊓D ;
• For every concept name A ∈ C and every x ∈ ∆R
′′
, x ∈ AR
′′
iff one of the two
following cases holds: either x ∈ ∆RD⊓E for some D ⊏∼ E ∈ D
rank
<i and x ∈ A
RC⊓D , or
x ∈ ∆R
′
and x ∈ AR
′
;
• For every role name r ∈ R and every x, y ∈ ∆R
′′
, (x, y) ∈ rR
′′
iff one of the two
following cases holds: either x, y ∈ ∆RC⊓D for some C ⊏∼D ∈ D
rank
<i and (x, y) ∈ r
R′′,
or x, y ∈ ∆R
′
and (x, y) ∈ rR
′
;
• For every x ∈ ∆R
′′
, hR′′(x) = j iff one of the two following cases holds: either
x ∈ ∆RD⊓E for some D ⊏∼ E ∈ D
rank
<i and and hRD⊓E(x) = j, or x ∈ ∆
R′ and
hR′(x) = j − i.
The idea is to create a model of KB that guarantees for a specific inclusion C ⊏∼D ∈ D
that the height of C in the model corresponds exactly to the rank of C. That is, given an
inclusion C ⊏∼D that has rank i, we have built a ranked interpretation R
′′ in which C has
height i. Now we need to:
• Prove that R′′ is a model of KB;
• Show that an isomorphic model to R′′ is in Mod∆(KB).
It can easily be proven that R′′ is a model of KB: first we prove by induction on the
construction of concepts that, for every x ∈ ∆R
′′
, x ∈ DR
′′
iff the corresponding object falls
under D in the original model; this grants us that R′′ satisfies T . About the satisfaction
of D, referring to the height values that have been assigned to each object in R′′, we can
prove that for every D ⊏∼ E ∈ D, hR′′(D ⊓ E) < hR′′(D ⊓ ¬E) (or hR′′(D) = ∞). Hence,
R′′ is a model of KB. Also, notice that in R′ we must have an object o s.t. hR′(o) = 0
and o ∈ (C ⊓D)R
′
. The construction of of R′′ implies that hR′(o) = i and o ∈ (C ⊓D)
R′′.
That is, R′′ is a model of KB in which hR′′(C ⊓D) = i.
53
∆R
′′
has been created unifying a finite number of model with the countably infinite
domain ∆ plus the finite domain ∆R
′
, hence ∆R
′′
has a countably infinite domain, and
there is a model R
′′
∆ that is isomorphic to R
′′ and has ∆ as domain.
Using Lemma 43, we can prove Theorem 4.
Theorem 4 Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base having a modular model. A statement
α is in the rational closure of KB iff KB |=rat α.
Proof:
Let KB be a defeasible knowledge base with a modular model, O the big ranked model
of KB, and ∆ the countably infinite domain used to define O. KB |=rat α iff O  α
(Definition 22), so we need to prove that O  α iff α is in the rational closure of KB. We
first prove the result where α is a DCI (of the form C ⊏∼D), that is, we need to prove that
O  C ⊏∼D iff rankKB(C ⊓D) < rankKB(C ⊓ ¬D) or rankKB(C) =∞. In turn, that means
that we need to prove that for every DCI C⊏∼D, hO(C ⊓D) < hO(C ⊓¬D) or hO(C) =∞
iff rankKB(C⊓D) < rankKB(C ⊓¬D) or rankKB(C) =∞. Such a result follows immediately
if we can prove that, for every concept C, hO(C) = rankKB(C), and that’s what we are
going to do.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 43 is that, for every C ⊏∼ D ∈ D, hO(C ⊓D) =
rankKB(C ⊓ D). Being O a model of D, if C ⊏∼ D ∈ D then hO(C ⊓ D) = hO(C) and
rankKB(C ⊓D) = rankKB(C). So, for every C ⊏∼D ∈ D, hO(C) = hO(C ⊓D) = rankKB(C ⊓
D) = rankKB(C). Now we extend such a result to any concept C, using a construction that
is in line with the one used to prove Lemma 43.
Since O  KB, if hO(C) = i, it is immediate that rankKB(C) ≤ i, otherwise it would be
hO(C) > i. We have to prove that for every concept C, if rankKB(C) = i, then hO∆(C) = i,
that is, there is a R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB) s.t. hR∆(C) = i. In case i =∞, Lemma 10 guarantees
that if rankKB(C) = ∞, then for all the R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB), hR∆(C) = ∞. In case i < ∞,
we can prove it by induction on the ranking value i.
Let rankKB(C) = i. For i = 0, we already have all that is needed to prove that there is
a R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB) s.t. R∆ 6 ⊤⊏∼ ¬(C):
• rankKB(C) = 0 iff KB 6|=mod ⊤⊏∼ ¬(C) (Definition 23);
• KB 6|=mod ⊤⊏∼¬(C) iff there is aR∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB) s.t. R∆ 6 ⊤⊏∼¬(C) (by Lemma 9);
• R∆ 6 ⊤⊏∼ ¬(C) iff hR∆(C) = 0.
• hO(C) = 0 iff there is a R∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB) s.t. hR∆(C) = 0.
For i > 0, we can define a modular model R of KB as follows:
Let rankKB(C) = i, and, as in Lemma 43, let Drank≥i be the subset of D containing the
DCIs with a ranking value of at least i, and Drank<i = D \D
rank
≥i . Let R
′ be a modular model
of T ∪ Drank≥i such that hR′(C) = 0. Such a model must exist, since rankKB(C) = i, that is,
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C is not exceptional in T ∪ Drank≥i . We can assume that R
′ has a finite domain, given the
finite-model property (Corollary 6), and hence it is a ranked model (Lemma 7).
Then we define an interpretation R′′ exactly as done in the proof of Lemma 43, and,
exactly as in Lemma 43, we can prove that R′′ is a model of KB with a countably infinite
domain and s.t. hR′′(C) = i.
That implies that there is a model R
′′
∆ ∈ Mod∆(KB) that is isomorphic to R
′′, with
h
R
′′
∆
(C) = i.
Since R
′′
∆ is used in the construction of O, hO(C) ≤ i; since rankKB(C) = i, hO(C) ≥ i.
Hence, hO(C) = i.
Lemma 11 For KB = T ∪D, if T |=
d
D ⊑ ¬C, then C ⊏∼D is exceptional w.r.t. T ∪D.
Proof:
It suffices to prove that if T ∪ D 6|=mod ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬C then T 6|=
d
D ⊑ ¬C. So, suppose that
T ∪D 6|=mod ⊤⊏∼¬C. This means there is a modular model R of T ∪D for which we have
an x ∈ ∆R such that x ∈ CR. Let I be the classical interpretation associated with R. It
follows immediately that I is a model of T and that x ∈ (
d
D)I , but that x /∈ (¬C)I .
Lemma 44 (∗) Let KB = T ∪D. Then ( i) KB ⊆ Cnrat(KB) and ( ii) Cnrat(KB) induces
a defeasible subsumption relation ⊏∼
KB
rat =def {(C,D) | KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼D} that is rational.
Proof:
Let KB = T ∪ D.
Proving (i): Assume C ⊑ D ∈ T . KB ⊢rat C ⊑ D iff T
∗ |= C ⊑ D; since T ⊆ T ∗,
T ⊆ Cnrat(KB). Assume that C ⊏∼ D ∈ D. Either C ⊏∼ D ends up in D
∗
∞, or there will
be an i (0 ≤ i ≤ n) s.t. rk(C) = rk(C ⊏∼ D) = i. In the former case, C ⊑ D is in T
∗,
and so T ∗ |= C ⊑ D, i.e., KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼ D. In the latter case, |= Ei ⊑ ¬C ⊔ D, and so
T ∗ |= Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D, i.e., C ⊏∼D ∈ Cnrat(KB). Hence T ∪ D ⊆ Cnrat(KB).
Proving (ii): Let ⊏∼
KB
rat =def {(C,D) | KB ⊢rat C⊏∼D}. We show ⊏∼
KB
rat satisfies all rationality
properties.
• (Ref). Since |= C ⊑ C is valid for any C ∈ L, we have that T ∗ |= Ei ⊓ C ⊑ C for
any T ∗ and Ei.
• (LLE). C⊏∼E ∈ Cnrat(KB) implies that T
∗ |= Ei⊓C ⊑ E for some i (or T ∗ |= C ⊑ E,
if rk(C) = ∞). Since |= C ≡ D, Ei is the lowest i s.t. T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬D, and
T ∗ |= Ei ⊓D ⊑ E, too.
• (And). T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓C ⊑ D and T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓C ⊑ E (possibly without
d
Ei, if C has
an infinite rank), hence T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D ⊓ E, that is, C ⊏∼D ⊓ E ∈ Cnrat(KB).
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• (Or). T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ E for some i and T
∗ |=
d
Ej ⊓D ⊑ E for some j. Assume
that i ≤ j and i <∞, that is, |=
d
Ei ⊑
d
Ej. Then, since T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬C, we have
that T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬(C⊔D). Moreover T ∗ |=
d
Ej⊓D ⊑ E and |=
d
Ei ⊑
d
Ej imply
that T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓D ⊑ E. So, T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ (C ⊔D) ⊑ E. The proof is analogous for
j ≤ i with j <∞, or if i and j correspond to ∞.
• (RW). C ⊏∼D ∈ Cnrat(KB) if T
∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D for some
d
Ei (or T ∗ |= C ⊑ D, if
rk(C) =∞). Since |= D ⊑ E, T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ E.
• (CM). If rk(C) = i < ∞, T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D and T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ E for somed
Ei. Since T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D and T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬C, T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬(C ⊓ D),
otherwise we would have T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D ⊓ ¬D, i.e., T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬C. Hence
we have C ⊓ D ⊏∼ E ∈ Cnrat(KB) since T
∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊓ D ⊑ E. If rk(C) = ∞, we
have T ∗ |= C ⊑ ⊥, and the proof is trivial.
• (RM). If rk(C) = i < ∞, T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ E and T
∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ ¬D for
some
d
Ei. Since T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ ¬D, T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬(C ⊓ D), otherwise we
would have T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ ¬D. Hence we have C ⊓ D ⊏∼ E ∈ Cnrat(KB) since
T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓C ⊓D ⊑ E. If rk(C) =∞, then we have T ∗ |= C ⊑ ⊥, and the proof is
trivial.
The following lemma states that, as in the propositional case [59], our procedure cor-
rectly manages the classical information, that is, an axiom C ⊏∼⊥ is in the rational closure
of KB if and only if it is also a modular consequence of KB.
Lemma 45 (∗) Let KB = T ∪ D and assume C ⊏∼ D ∈ D. Then KB |=mod C ⊏∼ ⊥ iff
rk(C) =∞ iff T ∗ |= C ⊑ ⊥.
Proof:
Let KB = T ∪ D.
For the only-if part, KB |=mod C ⊏∼ ⊥ implies that every rational subsumption relation
containing KB must satisfy also C⊏∼⊥. Hence we have that KB ⊢rat C⊏∼⊥, since Cnrat(KB)
induces a rational subsumption relation extending KB (Lemma 44). From Definition 27, we
know that KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼⊥ is possible only if C is always negated in the ranking procedure,
i.e., T ∗ |= C ⊑ ⊥.
For the if part, we define from KB a new knowledge base KB∗ =def T ∗ ∪ D∗, with T ∗
obtained from T by adding all the sets {C ⊑ D | C ⊏∼ D ∈ D
∗
∞} that we obtain at
each iteration of function ComputeRanking(·). Let us denote with D1⊑, . . . ,D
n
⊑ such sets.
Assume that T ∗ |= C ⊑ ⊥, but KB 6|=mod C ⊏∼ ⊥, i.e., there is a modular model of KB
in which C is non-empty. Let R be such a model, with an object x falling under CR.
Since T ∗ |= C ⊑ ⊥, there must be a GCI E ⊑ F in some Di⊑ that is not satisfied, that
is, given the nature of the GCIs in every Dn⊑ (T
∗ |= E ⊑ ⊥ for every E ⊑ F contained
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in some Dn⊑), this means that there is a subsumption E ⊑ ⊥ that is not satisfied in R.
Therefore, there must be an object y falling under ER. Hence, assuming E ⊑ F ∈ Di⊑,
since T ∪D1⊑∪. . .∪D
i−1
⊑ |=
d
{¬G⊔H | G ⊑ H ∈ Di⊑} ⊑ ¬E, eitherR  T ∪D
1
⊑∪. . .∪D
i−1
⊑
and y ∈ (G ⊓ ¬H)R for some G ⊑ H ∈ Di⊑ (Case 1 below), or R 6 T ∪ D
1
⊑ ∪ . . . ∪ D
i−1
⊑
(Case 2 below).
Case 1. Since R  KB, R is also a model of G⊏∼H , which is an element of D. Hence there
must be an object y such that y ≺R x (remember that x ∈ CR) and y ∈ (G ⊓H)R.
Again, since G ⊑ H ∈ Di⊑ (which implies T ∪ D
1
⊑ ∪ . . . ∪ D
i−1
⊑ |=
d
{¬G ⊔H | G ⊑
H ∈ Di⊑} ⊑ ¬G) and R  T ∪D
1
⊑∪ . . .∪D
i−1
⊑ , there must be a GCI I ⊑ L ∈ D
i
⊑ such
that y ∈ (I ⊓ ¬L)R, and we need an object z such that z ≺R y and z ∈ (H ⊓ I)R,
and so on. . . This procedure creates an infinitely descending chain of objects, and,
since the number of the antecedents of the axioms in Di∞ is finite, it cannot be the
case since the model would not satisfy the smoothness condition for the concept⊔
{C | C ⊏∼D ∈ D
i
∞} (see Definition 5).
Case 2. If R 6 T ∪D1⊑ ∪ . . .∪D
i−1
⊑ , then R does not satisfy some E ⊑ F ∈ D
j
⊑ for some
j < i, and therefore there must be an object falling under ER. Again, it is either
Case 1 or Case 2. Nevertheless, since at every iteration of Case 2 we pick a lower
value j for Dj⊑ and we have a finite sequence of D
j
⊑, we know that after some steps
(in the worst case when we reach D0⊑) we necessarily fall into Case 1, which cannot
be the case.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 45 binds preferential consistency (existence of a
preferential model – cf. Definition 6) to classical consistency.
Corollary 7 (∗) Let KB = T ∪ D. Then KB |=mod ⊤⊏∼⊥ iff T
∗ |= ⊤ ⊑ ⊥.
We can now prove that the knowledge bases KB = T ∪D and KB∗ = T ∗ ∪D∗ (in rank
normal form) are modularly equivalent.
Lemma 12 Let KB = T ∪ D and let KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗ be obtained from KB through
function ComputeRanking(·). Then KB and KB∗ are modularly equivalent.
Proof:
Given KB = T ∪ D, the function ComputeRanking(KB) outputs a knowledge base KB∗ =
T ∗∪D∗, in which the iteration of lines 5–13 identifies a (possibly empty) set {C1⊏∼D1, . . . , Cn⊏∼Dn}
of always exceptional defeasible subsumptions, that is moved from D to T . That is, we
have T ∗ = T ∪ {C1 ⊑ D1, . . . , Cn ⊑ Dn} and D∗ = D \ {C1 ⊏∼ D1, . . . , Cn ⊏∼ Dn}. It
is sufficient to prove that KB |=mod Ci ⊑ ⊥ and KB
∗ |=mod Ci ⊏∼ Di for every Ci ⊏∼ Di
(1 ≤ i ≤ n).
Let Ci ⊏∼ Di ∈ D \ D
∗. It means that, at some iteration through Lines 4–14 of func-
tion ComputeRanking(·), we have T ∗ |=
d
D∗∞ ⊑ ¬Ci, which implies that T
∗ ∪D
∗⊑
∞ |= ⊤ ⊑
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¬Ci, where D
∗⊑
∞ =def {C ⊑ D | C ⊏∼D ∈ D
∗
∞}). Since every D
∗⊑
∞ created at every iteration
is contained in the final T ∗, using such final T ∗ we have that T ∗ |= Ci ⊑ ⊥. Hence, by
Lemma 45 we have that KB |=mod Ci ⊏∼⊥, i.e., KB |=mod Ci ⊑ ⊥.
On the other hand, if Ci⊏∼Di ∈ D\D
∗, then Ci ⊑ Di ∈ T ∗, and hence KB
∗ |=mod Ci⊏∼Di
by supra-classicality (cf. proof of Lemma 46 below).
Now we are justified in using the rank normal form KB∗ = T ∗ ∪D∗ in order to analyse
the rational closure of the knowledge base KB = T ∪ D. Hence, in what follows we shall
assume that the knowledge bases we are working with are already in rank normal form
(and therefore D∞ = ∅).
In the next lemma, we observe that the inference relation ⊢rat respects the preferential
conclusions of KB w.r.t. assertions of the form ⊤⊏∼C, another desideratum proven for the
propositional case by Lehmann and Magidor [59].
Lemma 46 (∗) For every C ∈ L, KB |=mod ⊤⊏∼ C iff KB ⊢rat ⊤⊏∼ C.
Proof:
First of all, recall that KB ⊢rat ⊤⊏∼ C if T
∗ |=
d
D∗ ⊑ C (cf. Definition 27).
For the if part, first we need to prove two properties of |=mod, namely supra-classicality
(Sup) and one half of the deduction theorem (S):
(Sup)
C ⊑ D
C ⊏∼D
The derivation of Sup is straightforward: remember that C⊏∼C holds (Ref), assume C ⊑ D
and then apply (RW).
(S)
C ⊏∼D
⊤⊏∼ ¬C ⊔D
To see that (S) holds, assume C ⊏∼ D and note that |= D ⊑ ¬C ⊔D; we derive by (RW)
C ⊏∼¬C ⊔D. Since |= ¬C ⊑ ¬C ⊔D, we obtain ¬C ⊏∼¬C ⊔D by (Sup). Then apply (Or)
to C ⊏∼ ¬C ⊔D and ¬C ⊏∼ ¬C ⊔D, obtaining ⊤⊏∼ ¬C ⊔D.
Now we have to prove that if T ∗ |=
d
D∗ ⊑ C, then KB |=mod ⊤⊏∼ C.
From Lemma 12 we know that T ∗ ∪ D∗ is in the modular consequences of KB. Ap-
plying (S) to all DCIs C ⊏∼ D in D
∗, we have KB |=mod ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬C ⊔ D from each of them.
Applying (And) to all these DCIs, we have ⊤⊏∼
d
D′ and, by (RW’), we obtain ⊤⊏∼ C.
The only-if part is an immediate consequence of Lemma 44.
Lemma 47 (∗) For every KB = T ∪D and every C ∈ L, rankKB(C) =∞ iff rk(C) =∞.
Proof:
Let KB = T ∪D and transform it into a modularly equivalent knowledge base D′ composed
of only DCIs (see Lemma 2). Since the model O of the rational closure of KB must also
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be a model of D′, we can easily derive from Lemma 9 that KB |=rat C ⊏∼ ⊥ (that is,
rankKB(C) = ∞) iff KB |=mod C ⊏∼ ⊥. From Lemma 45 we have that KB |=mod C ⊏∼ ⊥ iff
rk(C) =∞, hence the result.
Lemma 13 For every defeasible knowledge base KB = T ∪D and every C ∈ L, rankKB(C) =
rk(C).
Proof:
From Lemmas 45 and 47 and Lemma 12 we can see that, given a knowledge base KB =
T ∪ D (possibly with an empty T ), we can define a modularly equivalent knowledge base
KB∗ = T ∗∪D∗ such that all the classical information implicit in D is moved into T ∗. KB∗
can be defined identifying the elements of D that have ∞ as ranking value, and Lemma 47
shows that w.r.t. the value ∞, rankKB(·) and rk(·) are equivalent, while Lemma 12 tells us
that KB and KB∗ are modularly equivalent. Once we have defined KB∗, Lemma 46 implies
that a concept C ∈ L is exceptional w.r.t. |=rat (KB |=mod ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬C) iff KB ⊢rat ⊤ ⊏∼ ¬C.
Hence the two ranking functions rankKB(·) and rk(·) give back exactly the same results.
Theorem 5 Let KB = T ∪D and let C,D ∈ L. Then KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼D iff KB |=rat C ⊏∼D.
Proof:
Since we have already proven Lemma 13, here we can use rk(·) to indicate indifferently the
equivalent ranking functions rankKB(·) and rk(·).
For the only-if part, assume KB |=rat C⊏∼D. That means that either rk(C⊓¬D) > rk(C)
or rk(C) = ∞. In the first case, it means that there is some i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, such that
T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬C and T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬(C ⊓ ¬D), hence T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D, i.e.,
KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼D. In the second case, we have T
∗ |= C ⊑ ⊥, which implies KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼D.
For the if part, assume KB ⊢rat C ⊏∼D. Then either there is some i which is the lowest
number such that T ∗ 6|=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬C (hence rk(C) = i), or T ∗ |= C ⊑ ⊥. In the first
case, we have also that T ∗ |=
d
Ei ⊓ C ⊑ D, which implies T
∗ |=
d
Ei ⊑ ¬(C ⊓ ¬D), i.e.,
rk(C ⊓ ¬D) > i. In the second case, rk(C) =∞, which implies KB |=rat C ⊏∼D.
Corollary 4 Checking rational entailment is exptime-complete.
Proof:
Observe that function RationalClosure(·) performs at most n + 2 (classical) subsumption
checks, where n is the number of ranks assigned to elements of D. So the number of
subsumption checks performed by function RationalClosure(·) is O(|D|). Furthermore, we
need to call function ComputeRanking(·) to obtain the knowledge base KB∗ = T ∗ ∪ D∗
and the sequence E0, . . . , En, which are needed as input to function RationalClosure(·).
First bear in mind that function Exceptional(·), with E as input, performs at most |E|
classical subsumption checks. From this, and an analysis of function ComputeRanking(·), it
follows that the number of subsumption checks performed by function ComputeRanking(·)
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is O(|D|3). Since we know that subsumption checking w.r.t. general TBoxes in ALC is
exptime-complete [1, Chapter 3], the result follows.
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